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INTRODUCTION
Every American deserves the freedom and opportunity to
dream the same dreams, chase the same ambitions, and
have the same shot at success[.] A growing number of Ameri-
cans recognize that their LGBT[Q+] family members, friends,
and neighbors deserve to be treated like everyone else in the
United States.  Yet today in America, in the majority of states,
LGBT[Q+] Americans live without the protection of fully-in-
clusive non-discrimination laws.  I believe America is ready to
take the next steps forward in the march for fairness, equal-
ity, and opportunity for every American.  It is time to take
bold legislative action.1
- U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin
Although the United States has made great strides toward
equality for its LGBTQ+ citizens in recent years, South Africa
has demonstrated far greater progress concerning equal pro-
tection and employment non-discrimination of its LGBTQ+ citi-
zens.  The South African Constitution, for example, expressly
prohibits all unfair discrimination on the basis of sex, gender,
or sexual orientation, whether the government or a private
party committed it.  In December 2005—a whole decade before
Obergefell v. Hodges2—the South African Constitutional Court
handed down Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, a landmark
decision that legalized marriage equality.3  Moreover, unlike
the United States, South Africa has federal laws that prohibit
employment discrimination against its LGBTQ+ citizens and
provide them with robust workplace protections.
This Note contends that employment non-discrimination
laws and workplace protections for LGBTQ+ citizens in the
United States are woefully inadequate.  Although some states
1 Press Release, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin, Historic Comprehensive
LGBT Non-Discrimination Legislation Re-Introduced in Congress (May 2, 2017),
https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/equality-act-2017 [https://
perma.cc/X8UR-ASW5].
2 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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afford robust protections for those who reside within their bor-
ders, many states do not.4  This results in a legal system in
which some citizens are protected by law against employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity while others are not.  “[E]qual dignity in the eyes of the
law”5 cannot and should not depend on one’s zip code.  Thus,
this Note further contends that the U.S.’ lawmakers and policy-
makers should look to South Africa as a model for implement-
ing federal laws that prohibit employment discrimination
against LGBTQ+ citizens and provide substantial workplace
protections.6
Although it is unlikely that the U.S. Constitution will be
amended to join the South African Constitution in prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity,7 there are other avenues to provide equally robust
workplace protections for LGBTQ+ individuals.  Perhaps the
most promising avenue is federal legislation that mirrors South
African laws.8  Indeed, members of Congress have proposed
pieces of legislation that would effectuate significant progress
in this area of the law.9  But not all of the proposed pieces of
4 See infra subpart II.A.
5 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
6 Other commentators have also advocated that the United States’
lawmakers and policymakers should look to South Africa as a model for protect-
ing the rights of LGBTQ+ citizens.  See, e.g., Eric C. Christiansen, Exporting South
Africa’s Social Rights Jurisprudence, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 29, 41 (2007)
(“[The South African social rights jurisprudence model] is exportable to other
nations seeking to enforce enumerated socio-economic rights because South Af-
rica has created its affirmative social rights jurisprudence that internalizes coun-
try-specific justiciability concerns.”); Lisa Newstrom, Note, The Horizon of Rights:
Lessons from South Africa for the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage,
40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 781, 803–04 (2007) (“Until American judges and lawmakers
are willing to learn from Fourie’s analysis by adapting and improving upon it . . .
the balance will remain skewed against same-sex families before the doors to the
courtroom even open.”).
7 Cf. Rick Jervis, Voices: Constitutional Convention an Unlikely Reality, USA
TODAY (Jan. 26, 2016, 12:17 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/
voices/2016/01/26/voices-constitutional-convention-greg-abbott/78849240/
[https://perma.cc/AU84-BWKA] (“It’s hard to imagine 34 states deciding on any
one thing.  Getting 38 of them to agree on a single amendment seems like an
impossible dream.”); Thomas F. Schaller, The End of Amendments?, U. OF VA. CTR.
FOR POL. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/
the-end-of-amendments/ [https://perma.cc/V4N5-FARH] (“[T]he fact is plans to
amend the Constitution are mostly a waste of time because, other than a widely
popular and highly-unifying suggested change, it is probably almost impossible to
ratify or even propose amendments in our highly-polarized nation and divided
national government.”).
8 See infra subpart I.C.
9 See infra Part IV.
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legislation are adequate.10  The United States should strive to
implement non-discrimination laws and workplace protections
that are equally as forceful as those in South Africa.  The
Equality Act, rather than the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act, is therefore the better piece of proposed legislation to
adopt.  In the absence of federal non-discrimination laws and
workplace protections, each state should continue to “serve as
a laboratory” and “try novel . . . experiments.”11  Additionally,
Fortune 500 companies should continue to lead the way in the
private sector by providing substantial workplace protections
to their LGBTQ+ employees.12
In Part I, this Note reviews South African non-discrimina-
tion and equal-protection law and jurisprudence by discussing
the South African Constitution, landmark Constitutional Court
cases, and significant legislation.  The cornerstone of South
African non-discrimination and equal-protection law and juris-
prudence is the Bill of Rights, which explicitly protects
LGBTQ+ South Africans from discrimination.  The government
has reaffirmed the Constitution’s commitment to equal rights
for LGBTQ+ South Africans through court decisions and acts of
Parliament.  This Note argues that South Africa’s progressive
non-discrimination and equal-protection legal regime should
serve as a model for the United States, which currently lags
behind much of the Western democratic world.
In Part II, this Note assesses the current state of non-dis-
crimination and equal-protection law and jurisprudence in the
United States.  Some states have stringent employment non-
discrimination laws and provide robust workplace protections
to its LGBTQ+ citizens.  But other states have no workplace
protections for its LGBTQ+ citizens.  And on the federal level,
there is no legislation prohibiting employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity in the private
sector.
10 Cf. Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw Support of ENDA after Hobby
Lobby Decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014, 4:37 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-
group-withdrawing-support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobby-decision/?utm_term=
.C6589d4152d6 [https://perma.cc/6BMP-R86S] (“The bill’s religious exemptions
clause is written so broadly that ‘ENDA’s discriminatory provision, unprecedented
in federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination, could provide religiously
affiliated organizations . . . a blank check to engage in workplace discrimination
against LGBT[Q+] people . . . .’”).
11 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
12 See infra subpart IV.C.
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In Part III, this Note considers the extension of the protec-
tions included in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
LGBTQ+ individuals.  The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has adopted this approach.  The federal courts,
however, have been more reluctant to do so because the Su-
preme Court has not expressly decided the issue.  Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari
in a case dealing with employment discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation and gender identity.
In Part IV, this Note discusses two proposed pieces of fed-
eral legislation that address employment discrimination based
on sexual orientation and gender identity.  Although LGBTQ+
advocacy organizations and their allies once supported the Em-
ployment Non-Discrimination Act, they have since withdrawn
their support for the Act because of its modesty.  The better
piece of legislation, this Note argues, is the Equality Act.  The
Equality Act extends Title VII’s protections to LGBTQ+ individ-
uals and better follows the non-discrimination and equal-pro-
tection law and jurisprudence of South Africa.
I
SOUTH AFRICAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The South African Constitution
After South Africa dismantled its apartheid regime, the
country adopted a “new and powerful constitution that pro-
vide[s] protections for individual rights and remedies for their
violation.”13  Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution in-
cludes the Bill of Rights, which “enshrines the rights of all
people in [South Africa] and affirms the democratic values of
human dignity, equality and freedom.”14  The South African
Constitution not only directs the government to “respect” the
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights but also to “protect,
promote and fulfill” the rights.15  The Bill of Rights extends to
“all law” and regulates the government and “all organs of the
state.”16  The Bill of Rights also regulates “natural” and “juris-
13 Newstrom, supra note 6, at 786. R
14 S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, § 7(1), 1996 (emphasis added).  The South African
Constitution took effect on February 4, 1997.
15 Id., ch. 2, § 7(2).
16 Id., ch. 2, § 8(1) (emphasis added).
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tic” persons in certain circumstances.17  Furthermore, the Bill
of Rights mandates that courts promote “the values that un-
derlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom” and “the spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights.”18
Section 9 of Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution
establishes the right of equality.  Section 9(1) boldly declares,
“Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law.”19  Section 9(3) further states,
“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gen-
der, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, col-
our, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience,
belief, culture, language and birth.”20 Discrimination on the
basis of one of the grounds in Section 9(3) is presumptively
unconstitutional.21
The inclusion of sexual orientation in Section 9(3) of the
South African Constitution22 was the product of victory over an
oppressive and discriminatory apartheid regime.23  After
apartheid, South Africa began the process of transforming itself
into a “human rights state.”24  Indeed, upon signing the new
17 Id., ch. 2, § 8(2); see also id., ch. 2, §§ 8(2)–(3) (explaining when a court will
apply the Bill of Rights to regulate a natural or juristic person and what factors
the court will consider).
18 Id., ch. 2, §§ 39(1)–(2).  The South African Constitution discusses the
“spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights” throughout its text.  For example,
in Chapter 1, the Constitution notes that South Africa is founded on the values of
human dignity, equality, human rights, and freedom, among others. See id., ch.
1, § 1.  The Preamble includes a similar discussion. See id. at pmbl.
19 Id., ch. 2, § 9(1) (emphasis added).
20 Id., ch. 2, § 9(3) (emphasis added).
21 See id., ch. 2, § 9(5) (“Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed
in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.”).
22 Hereinafter referred to as the “Equality Clause.”
23 See Eric C. Christiansen, Note, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet: Sexual
Orientation in the South African Constitutional Process, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
997, 1010–18 (2000) [hereinafter Ending the Apartheid of the Closet] (explaining
the impact that the “realities of apartheid South Africa” had on the South African
Bill of Rights and the Equality Clause); see also Tom Lodge, The Interplay of Non-
Violent and Violent Action in the Movement Against Apartheid in South Africa,
1983–94, in CIVIL RESISTANCE & POWER POLITICS: THE EXPERIENCE OF NON-VIOLENT
ACTION FROM GANDHI TO THE PRESENT 213, 227 (Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton
Ash eds., 2009) (describing the influence of the progressive activists who partici-
pated in drafting the South African Constitution).
24 Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of
Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 65 (1997); see also Albie Sachs,
Constitutional Developments in South Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 695
(1996) (“The goal [of the new Constitution] was to move from a racial autocracy to
a non-racial democracy, by means of a negotiated transition, the progressive
implementation of democracy, and respect for fundamental human rights.”).
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South African Constitution, Nelson Mandela declared, “By our
presence here today, we solemnly honour the pledge we made
to ourselves and to the world, that South Africa shall redeem
herself and thereby widen the frontiers of human freedom.”25
With the new South African Constitution, South Africa became
the first country to codify equal protection and freedom from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in its consti-
tution.26  This is especially significant given the state of equal-
ity for LGBTQ+ individuals in the rest of the world,27 and in
contrast to other African countries.28
It is curious that South Africa became the first country in
which “[LGBTQ+ individuals] possessed a level of constitutional
25 Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, Speech at the Signing of the
Constitution (Dec. 10, 1996), http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/speech-presi-
dent-nelson-mandela-signing-constitution-sharpeville-10-december-1996
[https://perma.cc/7JPW-CPVH].
26 See Eric C. Christiansen, Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation:
Twenty Years of Gay and Lesbian Rights Adjudication Under the South African
Constitution, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 565, 566–67 (2016) [hereinafter Substantive
Equality and Sexual Orientation] (“Among the exceptional elements of the South
African Equality Clause is its novel and progressive inclusion of anti-discrimina-
tion protections for lesbians and gay men.  The prohibition of discrimination
based on sexual orientation is particularly important because it occurred—for the
first time in any national constitution . . . .”).
27 See James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Mi-
norities as Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective,
60 ALB. L. REV. 989, 1028 (1997); see also Sebastian Maguire, The Human Rights
of Sexual Minorities in Africa, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (“In many jurisdic-
tions throughout the world, sexual minorities are considered a criminal class.”);
AENGUS CARROLL & LUCAS RAMO´N MENDOS, INT’L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND
INTERSEX ASS’N, STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD SURVEY OF SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION LAWS 8 (12th ed. 2017), http://ilga.org/downloads/2017/ILGA_State_Spon
sored_Homophobia_2017_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/L96U-9L27] (“There are
72 States that we classify as criminalising States . . . .”).
28 See Maguire, supra note 27, at 4 n.10 (listing the African countries that R
outlaw homosexuality); see also Kim Yi Dionne, Should We Call Africa
Homophobic?, WASH. POST (July 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/10/why-im-not-calling-africa-homophobic-
anymore/?utm_term=.B02cd7d34693 [https://perma.cc/Q7K4-W9QP] (“Like-
wise, using survey data from 39 countries, the Pew Research Center reports
widespread rejection of homosexuality in Africa . . . .”); David Smith, Why Africa is
the Most Homophobic Continent, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2014, 7:06 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/africa-homophobia-uganda-anti-
gay-law (“Western liberals eager to see the best in Africa must face an inconve-
nient truth: this is the most homophobic continent on Earth.  Same-sex relations
are illegal in 36 of Africa’s 55 countries, according to Amnesty International, and
punishable by death in some states.  Now a fresh crackdown is under way.”);
Jonathan Zimmerman, An African Epidemic of Homophobia, L.A. TIMES (June 29,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/29/opinion/la-oe-zimmerman-af-
rica-gays-20130630 [https://perma.cc/8YLL-NFNK] (“The South African exam-
ples speak loud and clear: Gay rights are human rights, not Western ones, so
everyone is enjoined to respect them.  Too bad other African countries don’t.”).
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protection greater than that of any other nation—a level of legal
protection that remains pre-eminent twenty years later.”29
Professor Eric Christiansen notes that, despite South Africa’s
religiosity and conservatism, the combination of three factors
unique to South Africa in the 1990s ultimately led the drafters
to include progressive constitutional protections for LGBTQ+
individuals.30  The three factors include the (1) history and
timing, (2) ideology and non-racialism, and (3) constrained
drafting process.31
First, South African LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations
started to realize a level of legitimacy and political recognition
in the years preceding the “fundamental constitutional re-crea-
tion of a state that had existed for forty-seven years with dis-
crimination as its primary political and social reality.”32  The
greater legitimacy of LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations and the
effort to include representation of various oppressed groups led
to the involvement of LGBTQ+ leaders in the anti-apartheid
movement.33  The LGBTQ+ rights movement was also gaining
momentum outside of South Africa’s borders.  In the early
1990s, the European Court of Human Rights twice affirmed its
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom34 decision holding that Section 11
of the United Kingdom’s law criminalizing homosexual acts vio-
lated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.35
Similarly, the United Nations Human Rights Commission con-
demned the Australian state of Tasmania for criminalizing ho-
29 Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 585. R
30 Id.
31 Id. at 585–87.
32 Id. at 587.
33 Id. at 586.  Professor Christiansen also notes that “unrelated occurrences,”
including the outing of an anti-apartheid leader as well as homophobic remarks
uttered by a key African National Congress Party figure, also contributed to recog-
nition and involvement of LGBTQ+ organizations in the anti-apartheid movement.
Id.; see also Derrick Fine & Julia Nicol, The Lavender Lobby: Working for Lesbian
and Gay Rights Within the Liberation Movement, in DEFIANT DESIRE: GAY AND LES-
BIAN LIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 269, 269–70 (Mark Gevisser & Edwin Cameron eds.,
1995) (describing the unrelated occurrences and how the occurrences led to the
African National Congress Party recognizing the importance of equality for
LGBTQ+ South Africans).
34 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
35 Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 586 (dis- R
cussing Norris v. Ireland and Modinos v. Cyprus); see also Norris v. Ireland, 142
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (holding that Ireland’s law criminalizing homosexual
acts violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights); Modinos v.
Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (holding that Cyprus’s law criminalizing
homosexual acts violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights); see generally European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (establishing the right to respect for private life and
family).
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mosexual acts.36  And although the Canadian Supreme Court
upheld a law that excluded same-sex spouses from collecting
guaranteed income supplements, the Court held that Section
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes
sexual orientation as a protected ground.37  In sum, the fall of
apartheid and the process of drafting a new constitution tran-
spired concurrently with the LGBTQ+ rights movement gaining
momentum both within and beyond South Africa’s borders.
Second, the principles of “non-racialism” and substantive
equality guided the African National Congress Party (ANC) and
the anti-apartheid movement more broadly.38  The principle of
non-racialism demands that the government both safeguard
human rights  and immediately terminate any and all discrimi-
nation.39  Indeed, the ANC’s 1955 Freedom Charter declares,
“All Shall be Equal Before the Law!” and “All Shall Enjoy Equal
Human Rights!,” and generally expresses a commitment to
equality and anti-discrimination.40  This vision of a South Af-
rica “founded on the principles of equality, multi-racial democ-
racy, and human dignity” persevered from its initial
articulation in the 1955 Freedom Charter through the fall of
apartheid.41  Fortunately for the National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) and other LGBTQ+ advocacy organi-
zations, this vision favored both including the groups in the
process of drafting a new constitution and expressly codifying
LGBTQ+ rights in the new constitution.42  Additionally, the NC-
GLE and other LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations formed coali-
tions with the ANC and other anti-apartheid political
36 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/
1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994); see also G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
annex, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19, 1966) [here-
inafter ICCPR] (establishing the right to equal protection before the law without
discrimination).
37 See Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.) (holding that sexual orien-
tation is a protected ground under Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms); see generally Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c. 11,
§ 15(1) (U.K.) (“Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”).
38 Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 586. R
39 Id. at 587.
40 The Freedom Charter, SOUTH AFR. HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.
za/article/freedom-charter [https://perma.cc/DYH2-YVF2] (last updated Aug. 4,
2016).
41 Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 586. R
42 Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 23, at 1037–38. R
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organizations prior to the abolition of apartheid in South
Africa.43
Third, party-based delegates and other experts largely ne-
gotiated and drafted the new constitution behind closed
doors.44  Small thematic committees consisting only of a rela-
tively small number of delegates and experts were responsible
for sequentially drafting and revising the text of each section of
the constitution.45  Additionally, the drafting process occurred
under “tight time constraints” and “strong political pressure”—
from both within and beyond South Africa’s borders.46  This
process resulted in a few influential party elites and experts
dictating a substantial portion of the new constitution’s text.47
Many of these drafters wholeheartedly espoused the principles
of “non-racialism” and substantive equality, and staunchly ad-
vocated for the inclusion of LGBTQ+ protections and rights in
the new constitution’s text.48  Moreover, the NCGLE and other
LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations leveraged their preexisting co-
alition with the ANC to ensure that the constitution included
protections on the basis of sexual orientation.49
Although the South African Constitution is a progressive
document that enshrines human dignity, equality, and free-
dom for LGBTQ+ South Africans, this Note recognizes that it is
not without shortcomings.  Section 16 of Chapter 2 of the
South African Constitution establishes the right of freedom of
expression.50  Subsection 2 of Section 16 excepts certain acts
of expression from constitutional protection.51  The exceptions
include: war propaganda, incitement of imminent violence, and
hate speech based on protected grounds that incites harm.52
While the hate speech exception renders hate speech based on
race, ethnicity, gender, or religion unprotected expression, it
does not explicitly do so for sexual orientation.53
43 See Jacklyn Cock, Engendering Gay and Lesbian Rights: The Equality
Clause in the South African Constitution, 26 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 35, 36 (2003).
But this alliance caused significant disagreement within the ANC over LGBTQ+
rights both before and during the transition period. See also Fine & Nicol, supra
note 33, at 270–72. R
44 Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 587. R
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See Newstrom, supra note 6, at 786. R
50 S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, § 16, 1996.
51 See id., ch. 2, § 16(2).
52 Id., ch. 2, § 16(2)(a)–(c).
53 Compare id., ch. 2, § 16(2)(c), with id., ch. 2, § 9(3).
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Section 37 similarly does not include sexual orientation as
a protected ground.54  Section 37 of Chapter 2 of the South
African Constitution establishes when a state of emergency
may be declared and the implications of such a declaration
concerning the rights established in Chapter 2.55  Subsection 5
of Section 37 states:
No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state
of emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action
taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or
authorise—any derogation from a section mentioned in col-
umn 1 of the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent
indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table.56
According to the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, the right of
equality is protected from legislation related to a state of emer-
gency declaration only “[w]ith respect to unfair discrimination
solely on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
sex, religion or language.”57  Thus, both Sections 16 and 37
demonstrate that the South African Constitution, which boldly
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, still
fails to provide the broadest protections for LGBTQ+ South
Africans.  Nonetheless, the United States can look to the South
African Constitution as a model for enacting robust legal pro-
tections for LGBTQ+ citizens.
B. South African Constitutional Court Cases
After successfully advocating to include LGBTQ+ rights
and protections in the South African Constitution, the NCGLE
and other LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations immediately began
challenging discriminatory laws still in effect from the
apartheid era.58  In response to these challenges, the Constitu-
tional Court, South Africa’s highest court, used the Equality
Clause to unanimously strike down countless discriminatory
laws.59  By using the Equality Clause to invalidate the discrimi-
54 Compare id., ch. 2, § 37(5)(c), Table of Non-Derogable Rights, with id., ch.
2, § 9(3).
55 Id., ch. 2, § 37.
56 Id., ch. 2, § 37(5)(c).
57 Id. Table of Non-Derogable Rights.
58 Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 588; R
Maguire, supra note 27, at 11. R
59 See, e.g., J v. Dir. Gen. 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) at 15–16 para. 23 (S. Afr.)
(striking down a prohibition of registering both the non-biological and biological
homosexual parents on the birth certificate of a child born from artificial insemi-
nation); Du Toit v. Minister for Welfare and Population Dev. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at
25 para. 25, 34–35 para. 44 (S. Afr.) (striking down sections of the Child Care Act
that unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in the
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natory laws, the Constitutional Court unequivocally reaffirmed
equal protection under the law for LGBTQ+ South Africans.60
South African Equal Protection jurisprudence, unlike that in
the United States, mandates applying the same level of scru-
tiny and protection to each protected class recognized in the
Equality Clause.61  Another key difference between South Afri-
can Equal Protection jurisprudence and American Equal Pro-
tection jurisprudence is the judicial system’s consideration of
“dignity.”62  The Constitutional Court has held that the equality
rights provided in Section 9 of the South African Constitution’s
Bill of Rights inextricably intertwine with the dignity rights
adoption context); Satchwell v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2002 (6) SA 1
(CC) at paras. 21, 37 (S. Afr.) (striking down sections of the Judge’s Remuneration
and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 that unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated on the basis of sexual orientation in the employment benefit context); Nat’l
Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at
para. 98 (S. Afr.) (striking down a section of the Aliens Control Act of 1991 that
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in the immi-
gration context); Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1)
SA 6 (CC) at para. 106 (S. Afr.) (striking down sodomy laws that unconstitution-
ally targeted homosexuals in the criminal law context).
60 Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 588. R
61 Compare Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 55
(S. Afr.) (“[Neither] our Constitution [n]or jurisprudence require us, in the way that
the United States Constitution requires of its Supreme Court, in the case of ‘. . .
rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution’s text,’ to ‘. . . identify the nature
of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection.’”), with Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to race-based
classifications), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to sex-based classifications), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574
(2003) (applying rational basis scrutiny to sexual-orientation-based
classifications).
62 Compare Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 55
(S. Afr.) (“The 1996 Constitution contains express privacy and dignity guarantees
as well as an express prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation, which the United States Constitution does not.” (footnote omitted)),
with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Constitution contains no ‘dignity’ Clause, and even if it did, the govern-
ment would be incapable of bestowing dignity.”).  Unlike in American jurispru-
dence, the right to dignity is widely recognized in international human rights
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948) at pmbl. (“Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world . . . .”); ICCPR, supra note 36, at pmbl. (“[T]he inherent dignity and . . . R
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .”); G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A,
annex, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (Dec. 16,
1966) at pmbl. (“[T]he inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world . . . .”).
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provided in Section 10.63  Three landmark cases, which this
Note discusses below, demonstrate the South African govern-
ment’s dedication to equal rights and equal protection under
the law for LGBTQ+ South Africans.  The United States—
whether through legislation or judicial decisions—should fol-
low South Africa’s example.
Although South African courts routinely invoke the South
African Constitution to enforce equal protection and equal dig-
nity, problems still persist for many.  While attitudes in South
Africa are improving, studies show overwhelming opposition to
homosexual conduct.64  The level of opposition to homosexual-
ity in South Africa also far exceeds the level of opposition in
nations with similar legal protections.65  And LGBTQ+ individ-
uals still face discrimination and violence from private actors.66
Indeed, in 2014, Minister of Justice Jeff Radebe noted, “Not-
withstanding the comprehensive constitutional and legal
framework and protection for LGBT[Q+] persons, we have sadly
witnessed acts of discrimination and violent attacks being per-
petrated against LGBT[Q+] persons.”67  The problems are am-
plified for LGBTQ+ individuals who are poor, Black, or
female.68  For example, the practice of “corrective rape,” which
is used primarily but not exclusively against Black lesbians,
entails sexually assaulting LGBTQ+ individuals to “cure” them
63 See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 28
(S. Afr.) (“[T]he common-law crime of sodomy [in addition to an infringement of the
right to equality] also constitutes an infringement of the right to dignity which is
enshrined in section 10 of our Constitution.”).  Justice Sachs also underscored
the interrelation of the rights to equality and dignity.  See id. at 150, 156–57
paras. 120, 125.
64 See TOM W. SMITH, NORC/U. CHI., GSS CROSS-NATIONAL REPORT NO. 31:
CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 17 (2011)
(explaining that a 2008 study found that about 84% of South Africans indicated
that same-sex sexual activity was “always wrong” while only about 8% of South
Africans indicated that it was “not wrong at all”); The Global Divide on Homosexu-
ality: Greater Acceptance in More Secular and Affluent Countries, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 4, 2013), http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-
homosexuality/ [https://perma.cc/E2PL-UHE5] (explaining that a 2013 study
found that about 61% of South Africans indicated that “homosexuality should not
be accepted by society” while only 32% of South Africans indicated that homosex-
uality “should be accepted”).
65 See supra note 64.
66 See HUMAN RTS. WATCH & INT’L GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMM’N, MORE THAN
A NAME: STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
179–230 (2003) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
67 Programme Against LGBTI Violence Launched, NEWS24 (Apr. 29, 2014, 4:31
PM), https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Programme-against-LGBTI-
violence-launched-20140429 [https://perma.cc/GP3J-Z5AL].
68 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 66, at 187–96. R
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of their homosexuality.69  This Note does not argue that the
fight for equality in South Africa is over.  Rather, this Note
argues that South Africa is a model to which the United States
should look concerning employment non-discrimination laws
and workplace protections.
1. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v.
Minister of Justice
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE)
v. Minister of Justice, the Constitutional Court of South Africa
unanimously invalidated the common-law crime of sodomy
and struck down a section of the Sexual Offences Act.70  The
Court based its decision on the Bill of Rights of the South
African Constitution, including the rights to equality, dignity,
and privacy.71  One commentator describes the case as “the
most meaningful judicial victory for the gay rights movement
since the abolition of apartheid.”72
The Afrikaner ideology’s oppressive commitment to main-
taining “morality” in South Africa produced a legal regime that
targeted and discriminated against LGBTQ+ South Africans.73
69 Lydia Smith, Corrective Rape: The Homophobic Fallout of Post-Apartheid
South Africa, TELEGRAPH (May 21, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
women/womens-life/11608361/Corrective-rape-The-homophobic-fallout-of-
post-apartheid-South-Africa.html [https://perma.cc/Q8Z5-DFHF] (“South Africa
has one of the highest rates of rape in the world—including ‘corrective rape’—
used to ‘cure’ lesbian women of their homosexuality.”); see also Clare Carter, The
Brutality of ‘Corrective Rape,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 27. 2013), http://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2013/07/26/opinion/26corrective-rape.html [https://
perma.cc/K7ZZ-A5PX]  (“[I]t became evident to me that multiple layers of South
African society were responsible for the epidemic of corrective rape and that bias,
apathy and culpability ran deeper than I could have imagined: in educational and
religious institutions, the criminal justice system, and even within families.”); Lee
Middleton, ‘Corrective Rape’: Fighting a South African Scourge, TIME (Mar. 8,
2011), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2057744,00.html
[https://perma.cc/8AB5-TS4W] (“Gays and lesbians are a particular target [of
homophobic sexual violence] in South Africa, as they are across Africa, where
traditional social conservatism is being distilled into an angry homophobia.”).
70 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 131 para. 106 (S. Afr.).  The Constitutional Court also
struck down discriminatory parts of the Criminal Procedures Act and the Security
Officers Act. Id. at 101–02 para. 74.  The Criminal Procedure Act considered
sodomy as equivalent to murder, rape, and fraud. See Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977, Sched. 1 (S. Afr.).
71 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at paras. 27–31 (S.
Afr.); see also S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, §§ 9, 10, 14, 1996 (recognizing the rights to
equality, dignity, and privacy).
72 Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social
Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 680 (2001).
73 Glen Retief, Keeping Sodom Out of the Laager: State Repression of Homo-
sexuality in Apartheid South Africa, in DEFIANT DESIRE, supra note 33, at 99, R
99–111.  The Afrikaner ideology’s oppressive commitment to maintaining morality
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Indeed, South Africa did not recognize sodomy as a crime until
Dutch colonizers brought the Roman-Dutch common law to
South Africa in the seventeenth century.74  The common law of
sodomy criminalized a range of sexual activities and prohibited
any sexual act lacking the purpose of procreation.75  An indi-
vidual convicted of sodomy was often sentenced to death.76
When the British gained control of South Africa from the
Dutch in 1806, the British preserved the common-law crime of
sodomy.77  The British went even further in the nineteenth cen-
tury, enacting and enforcing criminal codes that criminalized
homosexual conduct between men.78  Furthermore, by the
twentieth century, the government continued to enforce the
common-law crime of sodomy and other “unnatural” sexual-
activity prohibitions for homosexual conduct but not for heter-
osexual conduct.79
When the Afrikaner Reunited National Party gained control
of the South African House of Assembly from the British Union
Party in 1948, the Afrikaner Reunited National Party began
enacting a myriad of oppressive laws.80  The post-1948
apartheid laws included laws that codified the common-law
criminalization of sodomy and homosexual conduct between
men.81  For example, the Immorality Act of 1957 prohibited
certain conduct “relating to brothels and unlawful carnal inter-
course and other acts in relation thereto,”82 which included
also motivated the apartheid policies aimed at preserving the moral purity of the
white nation. See Voris E. Johnson, Comment, Making Words on a Page Become
Everyday Life: A Strategy to Help Gay Men and Lesbians Achieve Full Equality
Under South Africa’s Constitution, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 583, 591 (1997).
74 Heidi Joy Schmid, Decriminalization of Sodomy Under South Africa’s 1996
Constitution: Implications for South African and U.S. Law, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 163, 165 (2000); see generally Kevan Botha & Edwin Cameron, South
Africa, in SOCIOLEGAL CONTROL OF HOMOSEXUALITY: A MULTI-NATION COMPARISON 5,
5–9 (Donald J. West & Richard Green eds., 1997) (presenting a survey of sodomy
laws).
75 Pierre De Vos, On the Legal Construction of Gay and Lesbian Identity and
South Africa’s Transitional Constitution, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 265, 274 (1996).
76 Id. at 274–75.  But sentencing individuals convicted of sodomy to death
became disfavored by 1886. See Botha & Cameron, supra note 74, at 11–12. R
77 Johanna Bond, Gender and Non-Normative Sex in Sub-Saharan Africa, 23
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 65, 120 (2016).
78 See Schmid, supra note 74, at 165. R
79 Johnson, supra note 73, at 592. R
80 WILLEM DE KLERK, THE PURITANS IN AFRICA 215–20 (1983).
81 Johnson, supra note 73, at 592. R
82 Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 (S. Afr.).  The Immorality Act of 1988
renamed the Immorality Act of 1957 as the Sexual Offences Act of 1957. See
Johnson, supra note 73, at 593 n.40. R
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acts such as interracial sex, prostitution, and cruising.83  Al-
though the Immorality Act of 1957 did not explicitly criminalize
homosexual conduct between men, the government later did so
using the Act as the basis.84
Following a police raid in Forest Town, South Africa involv-
ing a party of homosexual men, the government amended the
Immorality Act of 1957 to include Section 20A.85  The amended
section imposed punishment on “[any] male person who com-
mits with another male person at a party any act which is
calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual gratifi-
cation . . . .”86  The amendment also raised the age of consent
for homosexual men to nineteen, while maintaining the age of
consent for everyone else at sixteen.87
In 1997, the NCGLE and the South African Human Rights
Commission filed a constitutional challenge to sodomy laws in
the High Court.88  The challengers contended that the sodomy
laws targeted only men and homosexual conduct between
men.89  This targeting, the challengers argued, violated the
Equality Clause of the South African Constitution by unfairly
discriminating based on gender and sexual orientation.90  The
High Court agreed.91
On appeal, the Constitutional Court unanimously affirmed
the High Court’s decision and struck down the challenged sod-
omy laws.92  Justice Ackermann, addressing the principal is-
sue of whether the sodomy laws violated the right of equality,
83 Schmid, supra note 74, at 166.  Some commentators define “cruising” as a R
term to describe the act of men looking for casual sex. See Jordan Blair Woods,
Don’t Tap, Don’t Stare, and Keep Your Hands to Yourself!  Critiquing the Legality of
Gay Sting Operations, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 545, 545 n.3 (2009).
84 Johnson, supra note 73, at 593. R
85 See Schmid, supra note 74, at 166; Immorality Amendment Act 57 of 1969 R
(S. Afr.).  For a more comprehensive discussion of the police raid and the Immoral-
ity Amendment Act, see Johnson, supra note 73, at 593–95. R
86 Immorality Amendment Act 57 of 1969, § 3 (S. Afr.).  Section 3 of the 1969
Act inserted Section 20A into the 1957 Act.
87 See id. at § 1.  Section 1 of the 1969 Act altered Section 14 of the 1957 Act.
The age of consent for homosexual women was raised to nineteen in 1988. See
Immorality Amendment Act 2 of 1988, § 5 (S. Afr.).  Section 5 of the 1988 Act
altered Section 14 of the 1957 Act.
88 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1998 (6) BCLR
726 (W) at para. 2 (S. Afr.).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.; see also Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, The Decriminalization of Gay
Sexual Offences: The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v The Minis-
ter of Justice and Others, 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W), 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 461,
461–68 (1998) (describing Judge Heher’s decision in Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian
Equal. 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W)).
92 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 30 (S. Afr.).
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applied a three-step discrimination analysis.93  The analysis
asks whether: (1) the action discriminates based on a particu-
lar ground, (2) the discrimination is unfair, and (3) the unfair
discrimination is justified.94
Concerning the first inquiry of the analysis, the Court con-
cluded that the challenged sodomy laws targeted men and spe-
cifically homosexual conduct between men.95  Thus, the
challenged sodomy laws discriminated on the basis of gender
and sexual orientation.96  Addressing the second inquiry, the
Court noted that discrimination based on a ground stated in
the Equality Clause is presumptively unfair.97  In the alterna-
tive, the Court considered several factors to determine whether
the discrimination was unfair.98  Justice Ackermann
elaborated:
In order to determine whether the discriminatory provision
has impacted on complainants unfairly, various factors must
be considered.  These would include: (a) the position of the
complainants in society and whether they have suffered in
the past from patterns of disadvantage . . . ; (b) the nature of
the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved
by it . . . ; (c) with due regard to (a) and (b) above, and any
other relevant factors, the extent to which the discrimination
has affected the rights or interests of complainants and
whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental
human dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably
serious nature.99
The Court concluded that: (a) homosexual men are a “perma-
nent minority in society” and have been disadvantaged; (b) the
nature of the sodomy laws is to criminalize “private conduct of
consenting adults which causes no harm to anyone else”; and
(c) the discrimination has “gravely affected” the rights and
“deeply impaired” the fundamental dignity of homosexual
93 See id. at paras. 15–19 (describing the discrimination analysis and citing
Harksen v. Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at para. 53 (S. Afr.)).  The discrimination
analysis which Justice Ackermann applied has since become the “standard analy-
sis for all discrimination questions.” Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation,
supra note 26, at 589. R
94 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at paras. 16–17 (S.
Afr.).
95 Id. at paras. 11–13, 26.
96 Id.
97 Id. at paras. 17–18.
98 Id. at para. 19.
99 Id. (citing Harksen v. Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at paras. 50–51 (S.
Afr.)).
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men.100  Thus, the challenged sodomy laws discriminated un-
fairly.101  Finally, concerning the third inquiry, the Court
stated that the unfair discrimination may be justified only if it
satisfied the Limitations Clause of the Constitution.102  The
Court ultimately held, however, that “there is nothing which
can be placed in the other balance of the scale” and that “[t]he
inevitable conclusion is that the discrimination in question is
unfair. . . .”103  Thus, the challenged sodomy laws violated Sec-
tion 9 of Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution.104
In its analysis of whether the challenged sodomy laws vio-
lated the rights of dignity and privacy, the Court considered
court cases from other countries dealing with sodomy laws.105
The Court recognized a trend in which Western democracies
began decriminalizing sodomy and adopting more liberal legal
attitudes toward LGBTQ+ individuals.106  The Court also noted
that the United States was an exception to the trend.107  Jus-
tice Ackermann and the Court aptly noted that Bowers v. Hard-
wick was decided by a narrow majority of the United States
Supreme Court,108 the case was the “subject of sustained criti-
cism,”109 and the case was largely inconsistent with the more
100 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at paras. 23–26 (S.
Afr.) (citing Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case
for Human Rights, 110 S. AFR. L.J. 450, 452–58 (1993)).
101 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 26 (S. Afr.).
102 Id. at para. 17; see also S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, § 36(1), 1996 (“The rights in
the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality[,] and freedom, taking into account all
relevant factors . . . .”).
103 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 27 (S. Afr.).
104 Id.
105 See id. at paras. 40–57; see also supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text R
(discussing Dudgeon, Norris, Toonen, and Egan).
106 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 52 (S. Afr.).
107 Id. at para. 53; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
(upholding the sodomy laws of Georgia and numerous other states).
108 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 53 (S. Afr.).
Bowers was decided by a 5–4 majority of the United States Supreme Court. See
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.  The Court later overturned Bowers in Lawrence v.
Texas. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
109 Nat’l Coal. v. Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 54 (S. Afr.);
see also Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
373, 385–86 (1997) (“As a result, [Bowers] remains formally on the books, ‘still
good law’ only in the sense that it is available to be cited as binding precedent in a
lower court against anyone who actually attempts a direct privacy attack on a
sodomy statute.  But outside that specific and increasingly peripheral context, it
appears that its rational basis holding has, without much ceremony, been
ushered off the constitutional stage.”).
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recent case of Romer v. Evans.110  In addition to disregarding
Bowers for those reasons, the Court also observed that the
South African Constitution is far more progressive in its protec-
tions for its LGBTQ+ citizens than the U.S. Constitution.111
Even though the United States Supreme Court eventually
struck down sodomy laws, the South African Constitutional
Court did so nearly a decade earlier.  The NCGLE Sodomy Con-
stitutional Court case demonstrates South Africa’s commitment
to equal protection for its LGBTQ+ citizens—a model to which
the United States can and should look.  The same is true for the
Satchwell and Fourie cases, which this Note discusses below.
2. Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa
In Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa unanimously invalidated
sections of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Em-
ployment Act of 1989.112  The Court held that denying same-
sex spouses of judges the same employment benefits that the
government affords to opposite-sex spouses of judges violated
the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution.113
Similar to the Sexual Offences Act and the other sodomy
laws of the oppressive apartheid regime, the Judges’ Remuner-
ation and Conditions of Employment Act targeted and discrimi-
nated against LGBTQ+ South Africans.114  The Act stipulated
that the surviving spouse of a deceased judge would receive a
portion of the judge’s salary.115  In 2001, Kathy Satchwell, an
openly lesbian judge, and her partner, Lesley Louise Carnelley,
filed a constitutional challenge to the Act in the High Court.116
Although Satchwell and Carnelley were not legally married,
they had been in an “intimate, committed, exclusive, and per-
manent relationship since about 1986” and “live[d] in every
110 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 54 (S. Afr.);
see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (invalidating an amend-
ment to the Colorado constitution that prohibited local ordinances protecting
individuals based on sexual orientation).
111 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 55 (S. Afr.);
see also supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text (comparing South African and R
American jurisprudence concerning equal protection and dignity).
112 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 21, 37 (S. Afr.); see also Judges’ Remuneration
and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 (S. Afr.).
113 Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 23, 37 (S. Afr.).
114 See Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act, supra note
112. R
115 Id.
116 See Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 (12) BCLR
1284 (T) (S. Afr.).
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respect as a married couple . . . .”117  They argued that the
Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act pro-
vided benefits to the spouses of heterosexual judges, but with-
held benefits from the partners of homosexual judges.118  This
unequal treatment, Satchwell and Carnelley contended, vio-
lated the Equality Clause of the South African Constitution by
unfairly discriminating based on sexual orientation.119  The
High Court agreed, holding that the word “spouse” be read
as “spouse or partner, in a permanent same-sex life
partnership.”120
On appeal, the Constitutional Court unanimously affirmed
in large part the High Court’s decision and held that denying
equal benefits to homosexual partners is unconstitutional.121
The Court noted that it recognized various forms of legal part-
nerships in a previous case.122  Additionally, the Court pointed
to woman-to-woman marriages in traditional African socie-
ties.123  The Court next applied the three-step discrimination
analysis applied in the Harksen and NCGLE Sodomy Constitu-
tional Court cases.124  The Court concluded that the Judges’
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act discrimi-
nated based on sexual orientation.125  Thus, the Court pre-
sumed the discrimination to be unfair and unconstitutional.126
Finally, the Constitutional Court held that the word “spouse”
instead be read as “spouse or partner, in a permanent same-
sex life partnership in which the partners have undertaken re-
ciprocal duties of support.”127
117 Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at para. 4 (S. Afr.).  See id. at para. 5 for
further “evidence of their emotional and financial inter-dependence.”
118 Id. at para. 3.
119 Id. at para. 14.
120 Id. at para. 1.
121 Id. at para. 26.
122 Id. at para. 12 (citing Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of
Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para. 36 (S. Afr.)).
123 Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at para. 12 (S. Afr.); see generally C.O.
Akpamgbo, A “Woman to Woman” Marriage and the Repugnancy Clause: A Case of
Putting New Wine into Old Bottles, 14 AFR. L. STUD. 87, 92 (1977) (“If the local law
recognises a ‘woman to woman’ marriage, and the incidents of such status are
sought to be enforced, it is not the place of the law to invoke the repugnancy test
to exclude the application of such customary rules.”).
124 Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 20–21 (S. Afr.); see also supra note
93 and accompanying text. R
125 Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at para. 21 (S. Afr.).
126 Id. at para. 23; see also S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2, § 9(5), 1996.
127 Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 34, 37 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
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3. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie
In Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, the Constitutional
Court of South Africa unanimously invalidated the common-
law definition of marriage and struck down a section of the
Marriage Act.128  The Court held that denying same-sex
couples the same status and benefits of marriage that the gov-
ernment affords to opposite-sex couples violated the Bill of
Rights of the South African Constitution.129
The Marriage Act governs the formation of marriages and
the procedures of marriage ceremonies.130  Although the Act
does not specifically stipulate that a marriage is only between
one man and one woman, some courts interpreted the Act to
mean exactly that.131  Additionally, according to the South Afri-
can common law, which developed from Roman-Dutch law,
marriage is the “union of one man with one woman, to the
exclusion . . . of all others.”132  In 2002, Marie Fourie and her
partner, Cecelia Bonthuys, filed a constitutional challenge in
the High Court to the limitation of marriage to one man and one
woman.133  Fourie and Bonthuys had been in a relationship for
more than ten years and wished to get married and obtain legal
recognition as spouses.134  They argued that excluding homo-
sexual couples from civil marriages and legal recognition as
spouses violated the Equality Clause of the South African Con-
stitution by unfairly discriminating based on sexual orienta-
tion.135  The High Court disagreed and refused to invalidate the
exclusion of homosexual couples from marriage.136
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the High
Court’s decision.137  The Supreme Court unanimously found
that excluding homosexual couples from marriage unfairly dis-
criminated based on sexual orientation and the majority opin-
ion interpreted the common-law definition of marriage to
include homosexual couples.138  The majority opinion, how-
128 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 118, 120 (S. Afr.); see also Marriage Act 25
of 1961 (S. Afr.).
129 Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 78–79, 114 (S. Afr.).
130 Marriage Act, supra note 128; Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 3. R
131 Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 7 (S. Afr.) (discussing the decision of
the High Court).
132 Id. at paras. 3–4 (S. Afr.) (citing Mashia Ebrahim v. Mahomed Essop 1905
TS 59, 61 (S. Afr.)).
133 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie (2002) ZAGPHC 1 (S. Afr.).
134 Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 1 (S. Afr.).
135 Id. at paras. 2–3.
136 Id. at para. 7.
137 Id. at para. 12.
138 Id. at paras. 12, 22.
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ever, did not render judgment on the Marriage Act.139  The
minority opinion, on the other hand, would have interpreted
the Marriage Act to include homosexual couples.140
Justice Albie Sachs, writing for a unanimous Constitu-
tional Court, first reviewed the prior Constitutional Court cases
dealing with unfair discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion.141  According to the Court, those cases proclaimed that
equality, dignity, freedom, and human rights form the founda-
tion of South African society and its legal system.142  The Court
elaborated:
[W]hat is at stake is not simply a question of removing an
injustice experienced by a particular section of the commu-
nity.  At issue is a need to affirm the very character of our
society as one based on tolerance and mutual respect.  The
test of tolerance is not how one finds space for people with
whom, and practice with which, one feels comfortable, but
how one accommodates the expression of what is
discomfiting.143
The Court then discussed the importance of marriage and con-
cluded that exclusion of homosexual couples from marriage
constitutes unfair discrimination.144  Thus, the Court held that
both the common-law definition of marriage and Section 30(1)
of the Marriage Act violate Section 9 of the Bill of Rights.145  The
Court, however, deferred implementation of its ruling for one
year in order to provide Parliament the opportunity to correct
the violation.146  Justice O’Regan, while disagreeing with “very
little in the comprehensive and careful judgment of [Justice]
Sachs,” dissented on the choice of remedy.147  The proper rem-
edy, Justice O’Regan opined, is a decision by the Constitutional
Court reading-in language to Section 30(1) of the Marriage Act
that comports with the provisions of Section 9 of the Bill of
Rights.148
In 2006, Parliament passed the Civil Unions Act, which
legalized marriage equality in South Africa.149  With the Civil
139 Id. at paras. 21–22.
140 Id. at paras. 30–31.
141 See id. at paras. 49–59; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text. R
142 Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 60 (S. Afr.).
143 Id.
144 Id. at paras. 64, 71, 78.
145 Id. at para. 78.
146 Id. at para. 162.
147 Id. at para. 165 (O’Regan, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at para. 169 (O’Regan, J., dissenting).
149 Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 26, at 596; see R
also Civil Union Act 17 of 1996 (S. Afr.).
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Unions Act, South Africa became the fifth country in the world
to legalize marriage equality.150  The United States would not
legalize marriage equality for nearly another decade.151 Fourie
is simply another example demonstrating that South Africa
should serve as a model for the United States in the realm of
equal protection for LGBTQ+ individuals.  Although the United
States has since legalized marriage equality,152 “justice too long
delayed is justice denied.”153  The same is true in the employ-
ment discrimination context.
C. South African Non-Discrimination Laws
1. The Employment Equity Act
In 1998, the South African Parliament enacted the Em-
ployment Equity Act (EEA) pursuant to the mandate set forth
in Section 9(4) of the Bill of Rights.154  The EEA specifically
forbids discrimination in the employment context and seeks to
correct the disparities, disadvantages, and discrimination
caused by apartheid.155  The purpose of the EEA is to attain
employment equity by “promoting equal opportunity and fair
treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair dis-
crimination” and “implementing affirmative[-]action measures
to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by
designated groups.”156  To fulfill this purpose, the EEA requires
that every employer update their employment policies and
practices to eliminate any unfair discrimination on the enu-
merated protected grounds.157  The EEA includes both gender
and sexual orientation as protected grounds on the basis of
150 Gay Marriage Around the World, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2017), http://
www.pewforum.org/2017/08/08/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013/
[https://perma.cc/LEL2-7XGD] (listing the countries that have legalized mar-
riage equality).
151 See supra Introduction.
152 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
153 Martin Luther King Jr., The Negro Is Your Brother, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug.
1963, at 78, reprinted in Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/02/
letter-from-birmingham-jail/552461/ [https://perma.cc/K8KG-43ZF] (emphasis
added) (“For years now I have heard the word ‘wait.’ It rings in the ear of every
Negro with piercing familiarity.  This ‘wait’ has almost always meant ‘never.’ . . .
We must come to see, with the distinguished jurist of yesterday, that ‘justice too
long delayed is justice denied.’”).
154 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (S. Afr.); see also S. AFR. CONST., ch. 2,
§ 9(4), 1996 (“No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation
must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.”).
155 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 pmbl. (S. Afr.).
156 Id. § 2.
157 Id. § 5.
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which employers may not unfairly discriminate.158  The prohi-
bition of unfair discrimination also extends to harassment in
the workplace based on a protected ground.159
Not only does the EEA prohibit unfair discrimination but it
also mandates that certain employers implement affirmative-
action measures.160  The EEA defines affirmative-action mea-
sures as “measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified
people from designated groups have equal-employment oppor-
tunities and are equitably represented in all occupational cate-
gories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer.”161
To implement affirmative-action measures, the EEA provides
that certain employers must consult with its employees, con-
duct an analysis, prepare an employment equity plan, and re-
port on its progress to the Director-General.162  Finally, to help
advise the Minister of Labour and monitor and enforce the
provisions of the EEA, the Act establishes a Commission for
Employment Equity.163
2. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act
Like the EEA, Parliament passed the Promotion of Equality
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) pursu-
ant to Section 9(4) of the Bill of Rights.164  The PEPUDA seeks
to eliminate “deeply embedded” “social and economic inequali-
ties” and unfair discrimination remaining from “colonialism,
apartheid and patriarchy.”165  To achieve its end, the PEPUDA
prohibits unfair discrimination, harassment, and hate speech
based on the enumerated protected grounds.166  Like Section 9
of the Bill of Rights, the PEPUDA includes gender and sexual
orientation as protected grounds.167  Although the PEPUDA
specifically highlights race, gender, and disability throughout
its text, the Act does not differentiate between the enumerated
158 Id. § 6(1).
159 Id. § 6(3).
160 Id. § 13(1).
161 Id. § 15(1).
162 Id. § 13(2); see also id. §§ 16, 19–21 (further elaborating on the steps enu-
merated in § 13(2)).
163 Id. ch. 4.
164 Saras Jagwanth, Affirmative Action in a Transformative Context: The South
African Experience, 36 CONN. L. REV. 725, 730 (2004)
165 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
2000 pmbl. (S. Afr.).
166 Id. ch. 2.
167 Id. ch. 1.
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protected grounds.168  Finally, the PEPUDA establishes special
Equality Courts to address discrimination by private parties.169
The PEPUDA and EEA are more than mere non-discrimi-
nation laws; they both impose a duty to promote equality on
state and non-state actors.170  The acts are not only reactive
but also proactive.171  Some commentators note that legislation
like the PEPUDA and EEA recognize that discrimination and
inequality are systemic and structural.172  Although the first
step for the United States is to implement federal employment
non-discrimination laws and robust workplace protections for
LGBTQ+ individuals,173 the ultimate goal should be to imple-
ment legislation like the PEPUDA and EEA.  States that have
already enacted robust workplace protections for LGBTQ+ indi-
viduals should begin to “experiment” with legislation modeled
after the PEPUDA and EEA.174
II
THE CURRENT STATE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE POST-OBERGEFELL
LGBTQ+ RIGHTS MOVEMENT
In the aftermath of Windsor,175 Hollingsworth,176 and
Obergefell177—the recent landmark marriage equality cases—
the focus of the LGBTQ+ rights movement in the United States
has shifted from marriage equality to employment and housing
discrimination.178  Chad Griffin, President of the Human
168 Jagwanth, supra note 164, at 741; see also Promotion of Equality and R
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, supra note 165, §§ 7–9. R
169 Id. at ch. 4.
170 Jagwanth, supra note 164, at 741. R
171 Id.
172 See SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW 122 (2002) (“The duty [to promote
equality] becomes that, not just of compensating identified victims, but of restruc-
turing institutions.  Correspondingly, the duty-bearer is identified as the body in
the best position to perform this duty.”).
173 See infra Part IV.
174 See infra note 181 and accompanying text. R
175 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of
Marriage Act for denying equal treatment to same-sex marriages).
176 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (affirming the California Su-
preme Court’s decision to invalidate Proposition 8’s definition of marriage as a
union between a heterosexual couple).
177 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (invalidating state bans of
same-sex marriage).
178 This is not to say that problems concerning the realization of the right to
marriage equality did not persist after Obergefell. See, e.g., Barber v. Bryant, 860
F.3d 345, 350–51 (5th Cir. 2017) (considering Mississippi’s version of the First
Amendment Defense Act (HB 1523), which Mississippi passed in response to
Obergefell); Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 930–32 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (consid-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 26 10-JAN-19 11:58
258 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:233
Rights Campaign, notably said, “Even after this 50 state mar-
riage victory at the Supreme Court, in most states in this coun-
try, a couple who gets married at 10 a.m. remain[s] at risk of
being fired from their jobs by noon and evicted from their home
by 2 p.m. simply for posting their wedding photos on
Facebook.”179
A. State Employment Non-Discrimination Protections
FIGURE 1180
Current U.S. LGBT[Q+] employment discrimination laws.
Sexual orientation and gender identity: all employment
Sexual orientation: all employment, gender identity only in state employment
Sexual orientation: all employment
Sexual orientation and gender identity: state employment only
Sexual orientation: state employment only
No state-level protection for LGBT[Q+] employees
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ering a county clerk’s refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples after
Obergefell); Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1286–87 (S.D. Ala. 2015)
(considering Alabama’s refusal to comply with federal court orders to begin same-
sex marriages after Obergefell); cf. Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby
Lobby, and the future of LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015) (“I will
appraise the legal and political salience of Hobby Lobby, and religious freedom
concerns more generally, with respect to the development of LGBT anti-discrimi-
nation law.”).
179 Historic Marriage Equality Ruling Generates Momentum for New Non-Dis-
crimination Law, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 7, 2015), https://www.hrc.org/blog/
historic-marriage-equality-ruling-generates-momentum-for-new-non-discrimina
[https://perma.cc/CW7V-3Q8U].
180 LGBT Employment Discrimination in the United States, WIKIPEDIA (last edited
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Currently in the United States, over half of the states and
territories have employment non-discrimination statutes that
protect both on the basis of sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity in both the public and private sector.181  Two states have
employment non-discrimination statutes that protect only on
the basis of sexual orientation in both the public and private
sector.182  Several states have an executive order, administra-
tive order, or a similar action prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in only the pub-
lic sector.183  Finally, a few states have an executive order,
administrative order, or a similar action prohibiting discrimi-
nation only on the basis of sexual orientation and only in the
public sector.184  The remaining seventeen states have no em-
ployment non-discrimination protections for LGBTQ+
Americans.185
Feb. 1, 2018, 6:28 AM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_employment_
discrimination_in_the_United_States [https://perma.cc/RQ4J-5KP9].
181 For a comprehensive discussion of the states and territories, see Know
Your Rights: Transgender People and the Law, ACLU [hereinafter Know Your
Rights], https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/transgender-people-and-law
[https://perma.cc/G952-9SY4]; JEROME HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION
FUND, A STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES
(2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/
06/pdf/state_nondiscrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY42-YMF5].
182 These states include New Hampshire and Wisconsin. See HUNT, supra note
181.  In March 2018, however, the New Hampshire House of Representatives R
passed HB 1319, which prohibits discrimination based on gender identity in
employment, housing, and places of public accommodation. See Dominique Mos-
bergen, New Hampshire House Votes to Protect Transgender People from Discrimi-
nation, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2018, 3:04 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost
.com/entry/new-hampshire-transgender-anti-discrimination-bill_us_5aa0c62de
4b0d4f5b66d5a88 [https://perma.cc/TQL5-YBF9].
183 See sources cited supra note 181; see also Mosbergen, supra note 182 R
(discussing the New Hampshire House of Representatives’s approval of a new
transgender non-discrimination law).
184 See HUNT, supra note 181. R
185 Some cities and localities in these states, however, have passed local non-
discrimination ordinances. See, e.g., Lauren McGaughy, Shreveport Becomes Sec-
ond City in Louisiana After New Orleans to Pass Non-Discrimination Ordinance,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/
12/fairness_ordinance_shreveport_lgbt_gay_la.html [https://perma.cc/SJ4V-
2TMC].  Similarly, cities and localities in states that do not prohibit protections on
the basis of either gender identity or sexual orientation have passed local non-
discrimination ordinances. See, e.g., Dustin Gardiner & Amy B. Wang, Phoenix
City Council Votes to Amend Discrimination Law, AZ CENTRAL (Feb. 28, 2013, 9:38
AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/community/phoenix/articles/20130226phoe
nix-discrimination-law-amend.html [https://perma.cc/XPM9-D5UV]; Eric M.
Johnson, Anchorage Lawmakers Pass LGBT Anti-Discrimination Law, REUTERS
(Sept. 30, 2015, 4:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-alaska-lgbt/
anchorage-lawmakers-pass-lgbt-anti-discrimination-law-idUSKCN0RU2MX2015
0930 [https://perma.cc/8ALJ-7CUF]; Sanjay Talwani, Nondiscrimination Ordi-
nance Passes Unanimously in Helena, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Dec. 18, 2012), http://
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B. Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Protections
Although LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations and their allies
have put ample resources into pushing federal legislation that
provides protections for LGBTQ+ citizens, they have very little
to show for their efforts.186  The only federal law that expressly
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity is the Violence Against Women Act.187  Two
other significant pieces of federal legislation that protect
LGBTQ+ citizens are the Hate Crimes Prevention Act and the
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act.188  When Congress repealed
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, however, only lesbian, gay, and bisexual
service members enjoyed the “significant victory.”189  The law
still barred transgender service members from serving in the
armed forces openly.190  Given the lack of support in Congress
billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/nondiscrimination-ordi
nance-passes-unanimously-in-helena/article_1ea97782-b180-57fb-9e41-08ebf8
b462b6.html [https://perma.cc/5ELN-ED5Y].
186 See Lisa Bornstein & Megan Bench, Married on Sunday, Fired on Monday:
Approaches to Federal LGBT Civil Rights Protections, 22 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN
& L. 31, 46 (2015); Lupu, supra note 178, at 12. R
187 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(13) (2012) (current ver-
sion at 34 U.S.C. § 12291(b)(13) (2018)) (“No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, gender
identity, . . . sexual orientation, or disability, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity funded in whole or in part with funds made available under the Violence
Against Women Act . . . .”); Lupu, supra note 178, at 12. R
188 See Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 46; Matthew Shepard and R
James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835,
2839 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) (2012)) (adding sexual orientation
and gender identity as protected classes under the federal hate crime law); Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act, Pub. L. No. 111-321 (2010) (repealing the policy that
barred openly LGB citizens from serving in the armed forces).  By the time Con-
gress repealed Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, some federal courts had already ruled the
policy to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Log Cabin Republicans v. United States,
716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated as moot, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Plaintiff has demonstrated it is entitled to the relief
sought on behalf of its members, a judicial declaration that the Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell Act violates the Fifth and First Amendments, and a permanent injunction
barring its enforcement.”).
189 See Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 47. R
190 See id.  The Obama Administration later lifted the transgender military
ban. See Matthew Rosenberg, Transgender People Will Be Allowed to Serve
Openly in Military, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/01/us/transgender-military.html [https://perma.cc/8F66-7HQ9].  But the
Trump administration subsequently reversed the Obama Administration’s deci-
sion and reinstituted the transgender military ban. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis &
Helene Cooper, Trump Says Transgender People Will Not Be Allowed in the Mili-
tary, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/
politics/trump-transgender-military.html [https://perma.cc/D4YV-FNF9].  Sev-
eral federal courts have already enjoined the reinstitution of the transgender
military ban. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 217 (D.D.C. 2017)
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for more substantial protections for LGBTQ+ citizens, LGBTQ+
advocacy organizations and their allies have explored other op-
tions.191  In fact, the executive and judicial branches are re-
sponsible for bestowing most of the current LGBTQ+
protections.192
In 1998, President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order
13,087, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation in the federal civilian workforce.  But President Clinton
noted the limited scope of his Executive Order: “This Executive
Order states Administration policy but does not and cannot
create any new enforcement rights (such as the ability to pro-
ceed before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
Those rights can be granted only by legislation passed by the
Congress, such as the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act.”193  In 2014, President Obama signed Executive Order
13,672, which adds gender identity to the classes afforded
workplace protections in the federal civilian workforce.194  Ad-
ditionally, Executive Order 13,672, in tandem with Executive
Order 13,673,195 added both sexual orientation and gender
identity to the protected classes in the federal government con-
tractor and sub-contractor workforce policy.  President Trump,
however, issued an Executive Order in March 2017, that effec-
tively guts key parts of President Obama’s Executive Orders.196
(“Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED, however, in that the
Court will preliminarily enjoin Defendants from enforcing the [Trump administra-
tion’s] Accession and Retention Directives . . . .”); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d
747, 772 (D. Md. 2017) (“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [relating to
the policies and directives encompassed in President Trump’s August 25, 2017
Memorandum] is GRANTED.”); Karnoski v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
203481, at *32–33 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017) (“The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and hereby enjoins [the Trump administra-
tion] from taking any action relative to transgender individuals that is inconsis-
tent with the status quo that existed prior to President Trump’s July 26, 2017
announcement.”).
191 See Lupu, supra note 178, at 12. R
192 See Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 46. R
193 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement
by the President (May 28, 1998) (announcing President Clinton’s execution of
Executive Order No. 13,087, 3 C.F.R. § 13087 (1999)).
194 Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (2014); see also 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-1.1 (2017) (“The purpose of the regulations in this part is to achieve the aims
of [certain Executive Orders] for the promotion and insuring of equal opportunity
for all persons, without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or national origin, employed or seeking employment with Govern-
ment contractors or with contractors performing under federally assisted con-
struction contracts.” (emphasis added)).
195 Exec. Order No. 13,673, 81 Fed. Reg. 58,653 (2015).
196 Exec. Order No. 13,782, 82 Fed. Reg. 15,607 (2017); see also 48 C.F.R.
§ 22 (2017) (“Prescrib[ing] contracting policy and procedures for implementing
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In other words, federal government contractors and sub-con-
tractors will again be able to discriminate based on sexual ori-
entation and gender identity.
At the federal level, however, there are no employment non-
discrimination laws or LGTBQ+ workplace protections for em-
ployees in the private sector.  Currently, members of Congress
have introduced the Equality Act, but no meaningful action has
yet been taken.197  Given the grim prospects of passing the
Equality Act into law,198 LGBTQ+ advocacy organizations and
their allies have sought alternative strategies for ensuring em-
ployment non-discrimination protections.  One of these alter-
native strategies is arguing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity.
III
TITLE VII
The drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 included Title
VII to eradicate employment discrimination based on race.199
But Title VII is not limited merely to employment discrimina-
tion based on race.200  Indeed, Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
pertinent labor laws . . . .”); Zack Ford, Trump Revokes Executive Order, Weakens
Protections for LGBT Workers, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 29, 2017, 12:53 PM), https://
thinkprogress.org/trump-gutted-lgbt-executive-order-8dd0e3be69a/ [https://
perma.cc/N724-XUZ6] (“Enforcement of 13672, the LGBT protections, does not
require this order, but would have been stronger with it.”).  Also, Executive Order
13,673 was preliminarily enjoined in October 2016. See Assoc’d Builders & Con-
tractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:6-CV-425, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155232 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 24, 2016).
197 Equality Act of 2017, S. 1006, 115th Cong. (2017) (“A bill . . . [t]o prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation . . . .”);
see also infra subpart III.B.  The Equality Act was introduced in the U.S. Senate
on May 2, 2017, but still has not been considered by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee as of August 2018. See S.1006 - Equality Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1006/committees?q=%7B%22
search%22%3A%5B%22Employment+Non-Discrimination+Act%22%5D%7D&r
=2 [https://perma.cc/3TYH-R9HS].
198 See e.g., Ana Valens, The LGBTQ Equality Act is Headed Back to Con-
gress—But It Faces a Tough Crowd, DAILY DOT (Mar. 15, 2017, 6:14 AM), https://
www.dailydot.com/irl/lgbtq-equality-act-headed-back-congress-faces-tough-
crowd/ [https://perma.cc/86M2-F76W] (“[W]ith the Republicans holding a ma-
jority in both the House and Senate, activists fear that the act will be shot down
before any substantial progress can be made[.]”).
199 Melissa Wasser, Note, Legal Discrimination: Bridging the Title VII Gap for
Transgender Employees, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1123 (2016) (citing Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)).
200 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
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otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.201
To bring a cognizable claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must
show that an employer adversely treated a plaintiff qualified for
the position but did not adversely treat similarly situated indi-
viduals, and the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin motivated the difference in treatment.202  For a cogniza-
ble employment discrimination claim on the basis of sex, a
plaintiff can show that an impermissible motive based on sex or
sex stereotyping caused the adverse treatment.203  Some
courts have held that the term “sex” in Title VII applies both to
sex and gender.204
A. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
In 2012 and 2015, respectively, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruled that Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of gender identity and
sexual orientation as a form of sex discrimination.205  The
EEOC has determined that both sex-stereotyping and per se
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity
are prohibited by Title VII.206  These determinations not only
201 Id.
202 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
203 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
204 See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Thus,
under Price Waterhouse, ‘sex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that is, the
biological differences between men and women—and gender.”); Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“As Judge Posner has pointed out, the
term ‘gender’ is one ‘borrowed from grammar to designate the sexes as viewed as
social rather than biological classes.’ . . .  The Supreme Court made clear that in
the context of Title VII, discrimination because of ‘sex’ includes gender discrimi-
nation . . . .”  (citation omitted)).
205 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Facts About Discrimination in Fed-
eral Government Employment Based on Marital Status, Political Affiliation, Status
as a Parent, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, EEOC.gov, https://
www.eeoc.gov/federal/otherprotections.cfm [https://perma.cc/64KQ-ETYV]; see
also Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC
July 16, 2015); Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL
1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
206 See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d
594 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (holding that Title VII prohibits both sex-stereotyping and
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bind federal agencies but federal courts may also give the de-
terminations deference.207  This Note further discusses two of
these cases below.  Attorney General Jeff Sessions and the De-
partment of Justice, however, have since issued legal guide-
lines declaring that employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity is legal under Title VII.208
This has resulted in confusion concerning the law and the U.S.
government taking inconsistent positions in litigation.209
In Macy v. Holder, the EEOC ruled that discrimination on
the basis of gender identity is tantamount to sex discrimina-
tion.210  The complainant, Mia Macy, alleged that the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) discriminated
against her based on her gender identity.211  Macy applied for a
job at the ATF’s crime laboratory in Walnut Creek, Califor-
nia.212  After applying, she spoke with the Director of the Wal-
per se discrimination based on gender identity); EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic,
P.A., No. 8:14-CV-02421-MSS-AEP (M.D. Fla., Sept. 25, 2014) (holding that Title
VII prohibits both sex-stereotyping and per se discrimination based on gender
identity); Baldwin,  2015 WL 4397641 (holding that Title VII prohibits per se
discrimination based on sexual orientation); Macy, 2012 WL 1435995  (holding
that Title VII prohibits per se discrimination based on gender identity); Veretto v.
Donahoe, EEOC Appeal No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401 (EEOC July 1, 2011)
(holding that Title VII prohibits sex-stereotyping based on sexual orientation).
207 Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 41; Laura Anne Taylor, Note, A Win R
for Transgender Employees: Chevron Deference for the EEOC’s Decision in Macy v.
Holder, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1165, 1190 (2013); but see Theodore W. Wern, Note,
Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the
ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1534 (1999)
(questioning whether courts are obligated to give deference to EEOC guidelines
and rules).
208 See Sari Horwitz & Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Ends Workplace Protections
for Transgender People Under Civil Rights Act, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/trump-administration-asks-
court-to-toss-out-challenge-to-military-transgender-ban/2017/10/05/3819aec4
-a9d5-11e7-92d1-58c702d2d975_story.html?utm_term=.7f26d029d7b2 [https:/
/perma.cc/8DL3-KJA8] (“In a memo to his U.S. attorney offices and agency
heads, Sessions said that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not protect
transgender people from workplace discrimination by private employers and state
and local governments.”); Alan Feuer, Justice Department Says Rights Law
Doesn’t Protect Gays, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/27/nyregion/justice-department-gays-workplace.html [https://
perma.cc/9JXQ-TAD8] (“The Justice Department has filed court papers arguing
that a major federal civil rights law does not protect employees from discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation. . . .”).
209 See Feuer, supra note 208 (“In its brief, the Trump administration’s Justice R
Department said the E.E.O.C., which had also filed court papers supporting [the
plaintiff in an employment discrimination action], was ‘not speaking for the
United States.’”).
210 Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *14
(EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
211 Id. at *1, *3.
212 Id. at *1.
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nut Creek lab, who assured Macy that she would get the
position pending a simple background check.213  But once she
disclosed her transition from male to female on her background
check, the ATF hired someone else for the position.214  The
EEOC noted that in Price Waterhouse the Supreme Court held
that under Title VII’s protection an employer may only consider
gender for employment decisions when gender is an occupa-
tional qualification.215  Therefore, the EEOC held that discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender identity violates Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it “by definition, [is] discrimi-
nation ‘based on . . . sex.’”216
Similarly, in Baldwin v. Foxx, the EEOC ruled that discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation equates to sex dis-
crimination.217  The complainant, David Baldwin, alleged that
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) discriminated
against him based on his sexual orientation.218  After working
at the FAA’s Miami facility in a temporary role and expressing
his desire for an open permanent position as a Front Line Man-
ager, the FAA did not hire him for the position.219  Baldwin
alleged that his supervisor, who was involved in the selection
process for the permanent position, made several disparaging
comments concerning Baldwin’s sexual orientation.220  The
EEOC again cited Price Waterhouse for the proposition that
employers may not “ ‘rel[y] upon sex-based considerations’” or
“take gender into account when making employment deci-
sions.”221  That proposition applies to claims brought by
LGBTQ+ complainants just as it would to heterosexual com-
plainants.222  And because “[d]iscrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is premised on sex-based preferences, as-
sumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or norms,” the EEOC
concluded that discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.223
213 Id. at *2.
214 Id. at *2–3.
215 Id. at *6 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989)).
216 Id. at *11.
217 Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at
*6–7 (EEOC July 16, 2015).
218 Id. at *1.
219 Id. at *2.
220 Id.
221 Id. at *4 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989)).
222 Id. at *5.
223 Id.
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B. In the Courts
The federal courts’ findings that Title VII bans employment
discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orienta-
tion have generally cited two Supreme Court cases for support.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that
employment discrimination on the basis of gender stereotyping
is unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII.224  The case in-
volved a female senior manager, Ann Hopkins, at a nationwide
professional accounting firm.225  Some of the partners in her
office recommended Hopkins for partnership candidacy.226
The process of selecting new partners entailed the firm solicit-
ing written comments about each partnership candidate.227
The partners ultimately decided not to admit Hopkins to the
partnership, but rather to “hold” her for reconsideration the
next year.228  Some of the comments indicated that she was too
“aggressive,” “harsh,” “difficult to work with,” “impatient,” and
“macho.”229  One partner even remarked that she needed “a
course at charm school.”230  Additionally, Hopkins was told to
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femi-
ninely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry”
to improve her partnership admission prospects.231  As a result
of this experience, Hopkins alleged that her firm, Price
Waterhouse, violated Title VII by discriminating against her
based on sex.232
Just three years prior, the Supreme Court held that sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.233
The Court, quoting City of Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart,234 stated that Title VII’s “because of sex”
provision includes “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from [gender] stereotypes.”235  The
Court emphasized its view that “[the United States is] beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assum-
ing or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
224 490 U.S. at 258.
225 Id. at 232.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 233.
229 Id. at 235.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 232.
233 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72–73 (1986).
234 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (citation omitted).
235 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 35 10-JAN-19 11:58
2018] WRONGFUL TERMI(GAY)TION 267
with their group . . . .”236  The Court’s reasoning ostensibly
prohibits employers from disciplining employees if they would
not similarly discipline employees of a different sex for identical
conduct or expression.  Thus, Price Waterhouse seemingly “per-
mit[s] an enormous range of discrimination claims.”237
Nine years later, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that same-sex harassment con-
stitutes unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII.238  The
case involved several male coworkers committing “sex-related,
humiliating actions” against the petitioner, Joseph Oncale.239
The harassment, however, did not stop there; the coworkers
also “physically assaulted Oncale in a sexual manner” and
threatened to rape him.240  Oncale complained to supervisors,
but they did nothing.241  Eventually, Oncale quit and requested
that the documentation show that he “voluntarily left due to
sexual harassment and verbal abuse.”242  Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, declared, “Title VII prohibits ‘dis-
criminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex’ . . . . [This] must extend to
[sex-based discrimination] of any kind that meets the statutory
requirements.”243  He reasoned that Title VII prohibits any
workplace conduct that meets the statutory requirements, in-
cluding same-sex sexual harassment.244  But the Supreme
Court has never explicitly addressed the issue of extending
Title VII protections to LGBTQ+ individuals alleging employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual
236 Id.
237 Ian Ayres & Richard Luedeman, Tops, Bottoms, and Versatiles: What
Straight Views of Penetrative Preferences Could Mean for Sexuality Claims Under
Price Waterhouse, 123 YALE L.J. 714, 720 (2013); see also I. Bennett Capers, Note,
Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1187 (1991) (“Because
lesbians and gays by definition undermine the notion of a binary gender system,
extension of rights to them would challenge the reward/penalization schema as it
now operates . . . .  This would further not only the implicit objectives of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, but also the explicit objectives of Title VII.”); Zachary A
Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-Conforming and
Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465, 497
(2004) (“Although originally conceived in the context of a heterosexual woman, the
gender stereotyping theory of sex discrimination [articulated in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins] has proved beneficial to a substantial portion of the homosexual
community . . . .”).
238 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
239 Id. at 77.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 79–80.
244 Id. at 80.
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orientation.  Thus, most federal Circuit Courts of Appeals re-
main reluctant to do so.245
1. Federal District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeals
Some federal courts, however, have been willing to find a
private right of action under Title VII for employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender identity.246  For example, in Mick-
ens v. General Electric Co., a federal district court denied a
defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss a Title VII sex-discrim-
ination claim in which a transgender plaintiff-employee was
fired for supposed attendance issues.247  The supposed attend-
ance issues, however, resulted from Mykel Mickens, the plain-
tiff-employee, having to use a distant bathroom after his
245 See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[S]exual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts under Title
VII.”); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] gender
stereotyping claim should not be used to ‘bootstrap protection for sexual orienta-
tion into Title VII.’”); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“Title VII’s protections . . . do not extend to harassment due to a
person’s sexuality.”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d
Cir. 2001) (“Congress has repeatedly rejected legislation that would have extended
Title VII to cover sexual orientation.”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply
because of sexual orientation.”); see also Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 237, at R
719 (“Congress has repeatedly failed to include sexual orientation as an explicitly
protected category under Title VII.  In deference to Congress, even the most pro-
gressive of courts have therefore only granted relief to bi/homosexual plaintiffs
who focus on their nonsexual gender-nonconformity—such as their manner of
speech or dress—rather than on their bi/homosexuality itself.”).
246 See, e.g., Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed. Appx. 492, 493
(9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]ransgender individuals may state viable sex discrimination
claims on the theory that the perpetrator was motivated by the victim’s real or
perceived non-conformance to socially-constructed gender norms.  After [Price
Waterhouse v.] Hopkins and Schwenk [v. Hartford], it is unlawful to discriminate
against a transgender (or any other) person because he or she does not behave in
accordance with an employer’s expectations for men or women.”); Roberts v. Clark
Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1014 (D. Nev. 2016) (“[B]ecause it appears
that the Ninth Circuit would hold that gender-identity discrimination is actiona-
ble under Title VII, I see no reason to depart from the heavy weight of this author-
ity.  Nothing in the few contrary decisions cited by the [defendant] persuades me
otherwise.  The contrary Seventh and Tenth Circuit decisions provide no cogent
analysis of Title VII’s language or Supreme Court caselaw.”); Doe v. Arizona, No.
CV-15-02399-PHX-DGC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36229, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21,
2016) (“Plaintiff states that he is transgender, thereby satisfying the ‘protected
status’ element of a gender discrimination claim.  Plaintiff alleges that his supervi-
sors have tolerated harassment of him and have breached his confidentiality by
informing prison inmates of his transition.  These allegations satisfy the ‘adverse
employment action’ and ‘disparate treatment’ elements of a gender discrimination
claim.” (citations omitted)).
247 No. 3:16CV-00603-JHM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163961, at *9–10 (W.D.
Ky. Nov. 29, 2016).
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employer denied him use of a more proximal male bathroom.248
Additionally, Mickens’s supervisor targeted Mickens for har-
assment and reprimand and told Mickens that nothing could
be done about it.249  The court acknowledged that the Sixth
Circuit and the Supreme Court were in a position at the time to
address the issue of discrimination on the basis of gender iden-
tity, albeit in the context of Title IX.250  Nonetheless, the court
held that Mickens sufficiently pled that his employer discrimi-
nated against him because “he did not conform to the gender
stereotype of what someone who was born female should look
and act like.”251
Similarly, in Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, the Elev-
enth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendant-
employer when the plaintiff-employee claimed that she was ter-
minated because she was transgender and there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to create triable issues of fact concern-
ing “her employer’s discriminatory intent” and “[her employer’s]
gender bias [as] ‘a motivating factor’ in [her termination].”252
The plaintiff-employee, Jennifer Chavez, met with the president
of her employer, Credit Nation, to discuss her gender transi-
tion.253  At this meeting, the president said he was “nervous”
about Chavez’s “condition,” told Chavez not to “bring up” the
issue of her transition, and instructed Chavez not to wear “a
dress or miniskirt.”254  A few days later, Credit Nation’s vice
president told Chavez to “tone it down” and to be “ ‘very careful’
because [the president] ‘didn’t like’ the implications of Chavez’s
planned gender transition.”255  After disclosing her gender
transition, Chavez became the subject of heightened scrutiny
and unusual discipline.256  Finally, Credit Nation did not follow
its own policies in the events leading up to Chavez’s termina-
tion.257  The court, considering the totality of this evidence,
248 Id. at *2–3.
249 Id. at *3.
250 Id. at *9 (citing G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d
709 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016); Bd. of Educ. of the
Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No. 2:16-CV-524, 2016 WL
6125403 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Dodds v. U.S. Dept. of Educ.,
845 F.3d 217, 222 (6th Cir. 2016)).
251 Id. at *9 (“[W]hat is clear is that the Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges
facts to support discrimination or disparate treatment claims based upon . . .
gender non-conformity or sex stereotyping.”).
252 641 Fed. Appx. 883, 892 (11th Cir. 2016).
253 Id. at 885.
254 Id. at 890–91.
255 Id. at 891.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 892.
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determined that Chavez put forth sufficient evidence to consti-
tute a triable issue of fact concerning her Title VII claim.258
Most recently, in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc., the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment for
the employer–defendant and granted summary judgment for
the EEOC on behalf of the employee–plaintiff.259  In doing so,
the court held that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the
basis of gender identity.260  The case involved a funeral home
director, Aimee Stephens, who worked for a closely held for-
profit funeral home.261  The funeral home’s mission statement
reflected the Christian values of its owners, and its dress policy
imposed different requirements for male and female employ-
ees.262  The owner of the funeral home terminated Stephens
after Stephens informed him that she would be transitioning
from male to female.263  Additionally, she had indicated that
she would be dressing as a woman while at work.264  Although
the Sixth Circuit noted that the district court correctly held
that Stephens was fired due to sex stereotyping, it also noted
that the district court erred when determining that discrimina-
tion based on gender identity is not actionable under Title
VII.265  The court cited to Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College
of Indiana,266 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,267 G.G. v. Glouces-
ter County School Board,268 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc.,269 and Zarda v. Altitude Express270 for support.271
258 Id.
259 EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 599 (6th
Cir. 2018).
260 Id. at 580 (“[W]e hold that the EEOC could pursue a claim under Title VII
on the ground that the Funeral Home discriminated against Stephens on the
basis of her transgender status and transitioning identity.”).
261 Id. at 566.
262 Id. at 567–69.
263 Id. at 569.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 574–82.
266 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); see also infra pp. 272–73 (discuss-
ing Hively).
267 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
268 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016); see also infra note 342 (discussing the R
Supreme Court’s decision to vacate and remand the Fourth Circuit’s decision).
269 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
270 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc); see also infra pp. 273–74 (discuss-
ing Zarda).
271 EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574–78
(6th Cir. 2018).
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The same is true for employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.272  For example, in EEOC v. Scott
Medical Health Center, a federal district court denied a defen-
dant–employer’s motion to dismiss, ruling, “Title VII’s ‘because
of sex’ provision prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.”273  The case involved a telemarketing manager
making offensive remarks to an employee, Dale Baxley, based
on Baxley’s sexual orientation.274  Baxley is a gay man and had
a male partner.275  Baxley’s employer, Scott Medical Health
Center, later constructively terminated him.276  The EEOC dis-
covered the workplace discrimination and sexual harassment
directed at Baxley in the course of a separate investigation
concerning the same manager’s workplace discrimination and
sexual harassment directed at five of Baxley’s former female
coworkers.277  The EEOC filed a complaint against Scott Medi-
cal Health Center on behalf of Baxley, alleging that the man-
ager’s conduct created a hostile work environment and violated
Title VII.278  The court rejected Scott Medical Health Center’s
contention that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based
on sexual orientation.279  The district court reasoned that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins280
and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.281 compelled
its finding that Title VII protected employees from workplace
discrimination based on sexual orientation.282  In reaching its
272 See, e.g., Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159 (C.D.
Cal. 2015) (“[T]he line between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimi-
nation is ‘difficult to draw’ because that line does not exist, save as a lingering and
faulty judicial construct.”); Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190,
1193 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (“[T]he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [cor-
rectly concluded] that claims of sexual orientation-based discrimination are cog-
nizable under Title VII.”).
273 217 F. Supp. 3d 834, 839 (W.D. Pa. 2016).
274 Id. at 836 (“Specifically, the Complaint alleges [the telemarketing manager]
‘routinely made unwelcome and offensive comments about [Mr.] Baxley, including
but not limited to regularly calling him “fag,” “faggot,” “[expletive] faggot,” and
“queer,” and making statements such as “[expletive] queer can’t do your job.”’”).
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 835.
279 Id. at 839–40 (“The Court sees no meaningful difference between sexual
orientation discrimination and discrimination ‘because of sex’ [under Title VII].”).
280 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
281 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
282 Scott Med. Health Ctr., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 841 (“Forcing an employee to fit
into a gendered expectation—whether that expectation involves physical traits,
clothing, mannerisms or sexual attraction—constitutes sex stereotyping and,
under Price Waterhouse, violates Title VII.  Simply put, [the telemarketing man-
ager’s] alleged conduct toward Mr. Baxley ‘stemmed from an impermissibly
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decision, the court also noted that other federal district courts
have reached the same conclusion.283  Finally, the court cited
Obergefell to suggest that there is “a growing recognition of
the illegality of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.”284
Similarly, in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College Of Indi-
ana,285 the en banc Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of the
plaintiff–employee’s complaint alleging a Title VII violation.286
In doing so, the Seventh Circuit seemingly overruled contrary
prior precedent and held that Title VII’s prohibition on sex dis-
crimination extends to discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.287 Hively involved an openly lesbian adjunct pro-
fessor at Ivy Tech Community College (Ivy Tech).288  Ivy Tech
denied Kimberly Hively’s application to become a full-time pro-
fessor at least six times between 2009 and 2014.289  Addition-
ally, in 2014, Ivy Tech refused to renew Hively’s part-time
contract.290  Alleging that Ivy Tech denied her applications on
the basis of her sexual orientation in violation of Title VII,
Hively filed a pro se complaint against her former employer.291
The district court dismissed Hively’s complaint with prejudice
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,292
which a panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed.293  The Seventh
Circuit then vacated the panel’s decision and granted a rehear-
cabined view of the proper behavior’ of men. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
236–37.”).
283 Id. at 841–42 (citing Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190
(M.D. Ala. 2015); Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151 (C.D. Cal.
2015); Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2014); Heller v. Columbia
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Or. 2002)).
284 Scott Med. Health Ctr., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 842 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015)).
285 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
286 For a more comprehensive overview and analysis of the Hively opinion, see
Camille Patti, Case Note, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College: Losing the Battle
but Winning the War for Title VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination Protection, 26
TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 133 (2017).  Although the Seventh Circuit noted that Bald-
win v. Foxx is merely persuasive authority, the court found the EEOC’s rationale
to be quite persuasive. See id. at 139–40.
287 Hively, 853 F.3d at 341–43, 352 (noting and seemingly overruling Hamner
v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000) and
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000)).
288 Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 3:14-cv-1791, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25813, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2015).
293 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 718 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d en
banc 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017).
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ing en banc,294 at which the full Seventh Circuit held that
Hively’s Title VII claim may proceed and that Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.295
The court noted that the decision “must be understood against
the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions”296 in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,297 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc.,298 Romer v. Evans,299 Lawrence v. Texas,300 United
States v. Windsor,301 and Obergefell v. Hodges,302 as well as the
EEOC’s decision in Baldwin v. Foxx.303  This monumental deci-
sion by the en banc Seventh Circuit created a circuit split.304
Most recently, in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., the en
banc Second Circuit held that the employee–plaintiff’s claim of
discrimination based on sexual orientation against the em-
ployer–defendant is actionable under Title VII.305  In doing so,
the Second Circuit overturned prior precedents that held that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is not prohibited by
Title VII.306  The case involved an employer–defendant termi-
294 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 15-1720, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20302,
at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).
295 Hively, 853 F.3d at 352.
296 Id. at 349–50.
297 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
298 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
299 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
300 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
301 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
302 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
303 EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC July 16, 2015).
304 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 341–42 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (citing Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012));
Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009); Dawson v.
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005); Medina v. Income Support
Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,
Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d
1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143
(4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th
Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
305 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 132 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(“Although sexual orientation discrimination is ‘assuredly not the principal evil
that Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII,’ ‘statutory prohibi-
tions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.’  In
the context of Title VII, the statutory prohibition extends to all discrimination
‘because of . . . sex’ and sexual orientation discrimination is an actionable subset
of sex discrimination.” (citations omitted)). 
306 Id. at 132 (overturning Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir.
2005) and Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000)).  The Second Circuit
also noted the cases in its “sister circuits” that were consistent with Simonton and
Dawson. Id. at 107 (citing Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th
Cir. 2012); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009);
Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Hamner v.
St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000);
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nating an employee–plaintiff because of his sexual orienta-
tion.307  Donald Zarda, the employee–plaintiff, served as a
skydiving instructor at Altitude Express.308  Donald Zarda also
was a gay man.309  Zarda often disclosed his homosexuality to
the female clients which he would be connected to during the
skydive when they were accompanied by their husband or boy-
friend.310  He did so to prevent any awkwardness resulting
from his contact with the women during the skydiving.311  On
one occasion, a woman informed her boyfriend of Zarda’s sexu-
ality while discussing their skydives.312  The boyfriend com-
plained about Zarda’s behavior to Altitude Express.313  Altitude
Express terminated Zarda soon after receiving the com-
plaint.314  Similar to the full Seventh Circuit in Hively,315 the
full Second Circuit noted that the case is heavily influenced by
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Price Waterhouse and Oncale,
among others.316
Prior to this momentous decision by the full Second Cir-
cuit, two recent panels of the Second Circuit held that Title VII
does not extend to discrimination based on sexual orientation
because they are bound by prior precedent.317  In one of the
panel decisions, Chief Judge Katzmann proposed that the full
Second Circuit “revisit” the question concerning Title VII and
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)).
307 Id. at 109.
308 Id. at 108.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 109.
315 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 349–50 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc).
316 Zarda, 883 F. 3d at 119–21.
317 See Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2017)
(citing Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) and Simonton v.
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000)); Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 82
(2d Cir. 2017) (citing Simonton and Omnicom).  Both the Omnicom and Zarda
panels, however, noted that gender stereotyping is actionable under Title VII. See
Omnicom, 852 F.3d at 200–201; Zarda, 855 F.3d at 82.  Before the Omnicom and
Zarda panels held that Title VII does not extend to discrimination based on sexual
orientation, panels of the Second Circuit made similar determinations in Dawson
and Simonton. See Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218; Simonton, 232 F.3d at 36.
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discrimination based on sexual orientation.318  The Second
Circuit then vacated these panel decisions and granted a re-
hearing en banc to determine whether Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation.319  The Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, heard oral arguments for Zarda on
September 26, 2017.320  The Second Circuit panel determined
that “Zarda may receive a new trial only if Title VII’s prohibition
on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on
sexual orientation—a result foreclosed by Simonton.”321  Al-
though the panel noted that it is bound by controlling prece-
dent, the court intimated that Zarda would be entitled to a new
trial if Title VII prohibited employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation.322  It seems likely that Altitude Express will
appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
2. Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital
Although some of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled
on the issue, the Supreme Court has never expressly decided
whether federal workplace protections apply on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity.323  In the 2017-2018
Term, the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity to extend
Title VII protections to LGBTQ+ individuals.324  Indeed, the
Court refused to grant Jameka Evans’s petition for writ of certi-
orari after the Eleventh Circuit dismissed her lawsuit claiming
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
318 Omnicom, 852 F.3d at 202 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring) (noting the
“changing legal landscape that has taken shape in the nearly two decades since
Simonton issued”).
319 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13127,
at *6 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017).
320 See Erin Mulvaney & Andrew Denney, Gov’t Agencies Spar in Second Cir-
cuit Over LGBTQ Rights, LAW.COM (Sept. 26, 2017, 8:44 PM), https://
www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/09/26/govt-agencies-spar-in-second-cir-
cuit-over-lgbtq-rights/ [https://perma.cc/HL3Y-F65S].
321 Zarda, 855 F.3d at 82.
322 Id. (“In sum, if Title VII protects against sexual-orientation discrimination,
then Zarda would be entitled to a new trial.”).
323 See Kelly M. Pen˜a, LGBT Discrimination in the Workplace: What Will the
Future Hold?, 92 FLA. BAR J. 35, 36 (2018).
324 See Andrew Chung, U.S. High Court Turns Away Dispute Over Gay Worker
Protections, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2017, 9:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-court-lgbt/u-s-high-court-turns-away-dispute-over-gay-worker-protec-
tions-idUSKBN1E51OT [https://perma.cc/7TM6-VQLH ] (“The U.S. Supreme
Court on Monday refused to hear an appeal by a Georgia security guard who said
she was harassed and forced from her job because she is a lesbian, avoiding an
opportunity to decide whether a federal law that bans gender-based bias also
outlaws discrimination based on sexual orientation.”).
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and gender non-conformity.325  Evans was a gay woman who
identified with the male gender, and faced a hostile work envi-
ronment because of her identity.326  She alleged that during
her tenure as a security officer at Georgia Regional Hospital,
she was “denied equal pay or work, harassed, . . . physically
assaulted or battered[,] . . . [and] discriminated against on the
basis of her sex and targeted for termination for failing to carry
herself in a ‘traditional womanly manner.’”327  Evans further
alleges that the hospital punished and retaliated against her
after she informed its human resources personnel of the hostil-
ity and unfair discrimination she faced.328
In her pro se complaint, Evans argues that Title VII’s prohi-
bition of employment discrimination on the basis of sex ex-
tends to her claims of discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender non-conformity.329  A magistrate judge
recommended dismissing claims with prejudice for failure to
plead an actionable claim, which the district court adopted.330
Reviewing the case de novo, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of Evans’s claim of discrimination
based on sexual orientation,331 but vacated and remanded with
instructions to allow Evans leave to amend her claim of dis-
crimination based on gender non-conformity.332
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly
dismissed Evans’s sexual orientation claim because Title VII
does not extend to discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion.333  The court cited Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,334 which held
that Title VII does not prohibit an employer from terminating
an employee on the basis of sexual orientation.335  The Elev-
enth Circuit also rejected Evans’s argument that Price
Waterhouse and Oncale336 support extending Title VII to dis-
325 See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
326 Id. at 1251.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 1250–52.
329 Id. at 1252.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 1257.
332 Id. at 1255.
333 Id.
334 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
335 See Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255.  Although Blum is a Fifth Circuit case, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that any decision from the former Fifth Circuit preced-
ing September 20, 1981 is binding precedent. See id. at 1255 n.4 (citing Bonner
v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
336 See supra subpart III.B.
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crimination based on sexual orientation.337  Furthermore, al-
though the Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on gender non-conformity, the court con-
cluded that Evans had yet to plead facts indicating that the
hospital punished and retaliated against her based on her gen-
der non-conformity.338  Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the district court erred in failing to provide Evans an op-
portunity to amend her complaint.339  Evans appealed to the
Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.340
By denying Evans’s petition, the Supreme Court failed to
live up to the words engraved on the pediment of its building.  If
the United States is to truly afford its citizens “equal justice
under law,” as South Africa does, the Supreme Court should
have granted certiorari, reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s deci-
sion, and extended Title VII to cover gender identity and sexual
orientation.  Fortunately, the Supreme Court will likely get a
second opportunity once the Second Circuit decides the Zarda
case.341  One must wonder, however, whether the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari for the Zarda case since the Court
denied certiorari in the Evans case.342  In the absence of a
337 Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256 (“The fact that claims for gender non-conformity
and same-sex discrimination can be brought pursuant to Title VII does not permit
us to depart from Blum. . . . Price Waterhouse and Oncale are neither clearly on
point nor contrary to Blum.”).
338 Id. at 1254.
339 Id.
340 See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557, 557 (2017) (denying Evans’s
petition for writ of certiorari).
341 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc
granted, No. 15-3775, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13127, at *6 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017);
cf. Ariane de Vogue, LGBT Employment Cases on Road to Supreme Court, CNN
(Sept. 26, 2017, 6:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/politics/lgbt-em-
ployment-case/index.html [https://perma.cc/CA2S-Q3G7] (discussing Hively,
Evans, and Zarda).
342 Cf. Patricia N. Jjemba, Expanding the Scope of Title VII: Will Sexual Orienta-
tion Become a New Basis for Employment Discrimination?, CBA RECORD, Septem-
ber 2017, at 40, 41 (“The plaintiff in Zarda may not have been an ideal plaintiff to
further the theory of sex discrimination on sexual orientation grounds. . . .  The
split between circuits already exists, and Ms. Jameka Evans of Atlanta, Georgia
may present the right set of facts for the Supreme Court to hear her case.”
(citation omitted)). Evans and Zarda deal predominantly with extending the
“based on sex” provision in Title VII to cover sexual orientation.  But the Supreme
Court also has the opportunity to conclude that “based on sex” also includes
discrimination based on gender identity, albeit in the context of Title IX. See
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 858 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2017)
(holding that Title IX’s “based on sex” provision prohibits discrimination based on
gender-identity), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-301, 2018 WL 1147062 (Mar. 5,
2018).  The Court was able to dodge a similar question in 2017 after the Trump
administration rescinded the Obama Administration’s protections for transgender
students in public schools. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239,
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Supreme Court ruling extending Title VII protections to
LGBTQ+ individuals, Congress must act by passing robust
workplace protections for LGBTQ+ citizens.343
IV
PROPOSED PIECES OF LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS
A. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity.344  ENDA, in its current form, states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment of the individual, because of such individual’s actual or
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for employ-
ment of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment or otherwise ad-
versely affect the status of the individual as an employee,
because of such individual’s actual or perceived sexual orien-
tation or gender identity.345
ENDA’s language is nearly identical to that of Title VII.346
ENDA also prohibits employers from retaliating against any
employee who reports an employer for violating ENDA.347
After previous defeats and a lack of success, LGBTQ+ advo-
cacy organizations and their allies altered their strategy con-
1239 (2017) (“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the . . . Fourth Circuit for
further consideration in light of the guidance document issued by the Department
of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017.”); see also Emma
Green, The Trump Administration May Have Doomed Gavin Grimm’s Case, ATLAN-
TIC (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/the-
trump-administration-may-have-doomed-gavin-grimm/518676/ [https://perma
.cc/A2P4-WUSZ ] (“The Supreme Court sent an important case concerning a
transgender student in Virginia back down to the Fourth Circuit . . . in part
because of the Trump administration’s new position on the issues involved in the
case.”).
343 Cf. Symone D. Shinton, Married on Saturday, Fired on Monday: The Sev-
enth Circuit Attempts to Navigate LGBT Rights After Obergefell, 12 SEVENTH CIR.
REV. 33, 61 (2016) (“Regardless of how the Seventh Circuit rules in Hively, Con-
gress must act to provide protections for LGBT[Q+] employees against this invidi-
ous discrimination.”).
344 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong.
(2013); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013).
Together, hereinafter referred to as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.
345 Id.
346 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. R
347 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, supra note 344. R
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cerning federal legislation in the 1970s.348  Instead of pursuing
an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,349 they began
advocating for “a more politically expedient, standalone bill”
focusing exclusively on employment non-discrimination.350  In
1994, members of Congress first introduced ENDA which they
modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act from just a few
years prior.351  The bill, however, only included protections for
LGB individuals.352  In 2007, Congressman Barney Frank in-
troduced a version of ENDA that also included protections for
transgender individuals.353  The 2013 version of ENDA also
includes protections for both sexual orientation and gender
identity.354  Although ENDA passed the Senate in 2013,355
Speaker John Boehner refused to bring the bill to the floor of
the House of Representatives for a vote.356  LGBTQ+ advocacy
organizations and their allies thereafter deserted ENDA and
focused their efforts on the Equality Act.357
B. The Equality Act
In 1974, Congresswoman Bella Abzug and Congressman
Ed Koch introduced the Equality Act in Congress.358  Con-
gresswoman Abzug’s bill, however, only extended protections
to LGB citizens.359  And not a single other member of Congress
348 See Alex Reed, Abandoning ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 281–82
(2014) [hereinafter Abandoning ENDA].
349 See infra subpart IV.B.
350 Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 48. R
351 Id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
352 Shalyn L. Caulley, Note, The Next Frontier to LGBT Equality: Securing Work-
place-Discrimination Protections, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 929 (2017).
353 Wasser, supra note 199, at 1116. R
354 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, supra note 344. R
355 Caulley, supra note 352, at 929. R
356 Wasser, supra note 199, at 1118. R
357 Id.
358 See Equality Act of 1974, H.R. 14752, 93d Cong. (1974); Alex Reed, A Pro-
Trans Argument for a Transexclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 50 AM.
BUS. L.J. 835, 838 (2013) [hereinafter Transexclusive Employment Non-Discrimina-
tion Act]; see also David G. Dodge, The Equality Act Turns 40, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 29, 2014, 6:03 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-g-dodge/the-
equality-act-turns-40_b_5352209.html [https://perma.cc/VL49-ELUJ] (“In May
of 1974, New York Representatives Bella Abzug and Ed Koch introduced the
‘Equality Act’ into Congress. . . .  It’s unfortunately a bittersweet anniversary; 40
years later—in a year when we’ve seen the first openly gay player drafted to the
NFL and same-sex marriage bans are falling across the country on a weekly
basis—we still lack federal anti-discrimination protections for LGBTQ[+] people.”).
359 See Equality Act of 1974, H.R. 14752 (prohibiting discrimination based on
sex, marital status, and sexual orientation in public accommodation, federally
assisted programs, and the public sector).
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signed onto the bill as a cosponsor.360  The bill died in commit-
tee without a vote.361  In subsequent Congresses, members of
Congress reintroduced the Equality Act or an equivalent bill.362
While the bills increasingly gained support from cosponsoring
members of Congress, the bills died in committee each time.363
The Equality Act reappeared in July 2015, after LGBTQ+ advo-
cacy organizations and their allies had abandoned their push
for ENDA.364
The Equality Act is similar, but not identical to ENDA.365
While ENDA is a stand-alone piece of legislation that applies
specifically to LGBTQ+ individuals, the Equality Act serves to
add protections for LGBTQ+ individuals by amending existing
civil rights laws.366  Amongst these civil rights laws is the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.367  In the context of employment non-dis-
crimination, the Equality Act would amend Title VII to include
sexual orientation and gender identity.368  The Equality Act
thus provides more robust and comprehensive protections for
LGBTQ+ individuals—in the employment context and
beyond.369
The Equality Act and amending Title VII, according to Pro-
fessor Alex Reed, have other advantages as well.  First, the
Equality Act and Title VII provide plaintiffs with the ability to
contest discrimination on either a disparate treatment theory
or a disparate impact theory.370  ENDA, however, only allows
for discrimination claims on the basis of disparate treat-
ment.371  Second, the Equality Act and Title VII forbid religious
360 See Transexclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act, supra note 358, at R
838.
361 See id.
362 Bornstein & Bench, supra note 186, at 48. R
363 Id.; see also William C. Sung, Note, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A
Case for Redefining “Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orien-
tation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 495–514 (2011) (recounting
the history of the Equality Act and equivalent bills).
364 Wasser, supra note 199, at 1119. R
365 See Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015); Equality Act, S. 1858,
114th Cong. (2015).  Together, hereinafter referred to as the Equality Act.
366 Wasser, supra note 199, at 1119. R
367 See id.; see generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241 (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in various contexts).  The other civil rights laws include: The Fair Housing
Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Jury Selection Service Act. See
Wasser, supra note 199, at 1119. R
368 See Equality Act, supra note 365; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). R
369 Wasser, supra note 199, at 1119. R
370 Abandoning ENDA, supra note 348, at 280–81 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, R
557 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2009)).
371 Abandoning ENDA, supra note 348, at 281. R
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organizations from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
national origin, and sex.372  Amending Title VII to include sex-
ual orientation and gender identity would presumably also pro-
hibit religious organizations from discriminating on these
grounds as well.373  ENDA, on the other hand, allows religious
organizations to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity.374  Finally, the Equality Act and Title VII
permit employers to implement temporary affirmative action
plans to diversify their workforce.375  This provision is similar
to that of the PEPUDA and EEA.376  ENDA prohibits using quo-
tas or giving special treatment to individuals based on their
sexual orientation or gender identity.377
In sum, although ENDA is a step in the right direction, its
protections for LGBTQ+ individuals are modest compared to
the more comprehensive protections included in the Equality
Act and Title VII.  Thus, in order to more closely follow South
Africa’s robust and progressive protections for its LGBTQ+ citi-
zens, the U.S. Congress should pass the Equality Act.  Until
that time, LGBTQ+ individuals will remain second-class citi-
zens whose employers may discriminate against them at will.
C. Progress in the Private Sector
Even without federal laws such as ENDA or the Equality
Act mandating employment non-discrimination,378 many com-
panies still provide equal rights and benefits to LGBTQ+ indi-
viduals.  The Human Rights Campaign’s annual Corporate
Equality Index (CEI) report scores large businesses based on
their “policies, benefits[,] and practices” pertinent to LGBTQ+
employees and their families.379  The Human Rights Campaign
invites Fortune magazine’s 1,000 largest publicly traded busi-
nesses and American Lawyer magazine’s top 200 revenue-
grossing law firms to participate, while any private-sector busi-
ness with 500 or more full-time employees can request to par-
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 See supra subpart I.C.
377 Abandoning ENDA, supra note 348, at 281. R
378 See supra subparts II.A–B.
379 HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2017: RATING
WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 2 (2017) [herein-
after CEI 2017], https://assets.hrc.org//files/assets/resources/CEI-2017-Fi
nal.pdf?_ga=2.248875847.1322983219.1509835382-537092078.1506700197
[https://perma.cc/G9JP-KJ2B].
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ticipate.380  The 2017 CEI report shows that 515 major
businesses earned a perfect score.381  The report also found
that 92 percent of Fortune 500 businesses include sexual ori-
entation in their United States non-discrimination policies,
while 82 percent include gender identity.382  Generally, busi-
nesses with top CEI scores receive positive media attention,383
while those with low scores receive negative or disparaging me-
dia attention.384  Indeed, “businesses know that LGBTQ[+]
equality isn’t just the right thing to do, it makes them stronger
in our global economy.”385  In the absence of action by Con-
gress or the Supreme Court, the private sector should continue
to lead the way by prioritizing non-discrimination policies for
employees, including those who identify as LGBTQ+.386  These
policies are not only beneficial for “form[ing] a more perfect
Union”387 but also for business.388
380 Id. at 8.
381 A total of 887 of the nation’s largest businesses participated in the CEI
report.  Thus, nearly 60% of the businesses in the “CEI universe” earned a perfect
score. See id. at 4, 9.
382 The CEI report considers the policies and practices of both Fortune 500
participants and non-responders.  A total of 327 of the Fortune 500 business
participated in the CEI report.  The participating Fortune 500 businesses earned
an average rating of 91, while 199 of the 327 businesses earned a perfect score.
See id. at 6.
383 See, e.g., Curtis M. Wong, Here Are the Best Places to Work if You’re LGBT
in 2016, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2015, 5:04 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.
comc/entry/corporate-equality-index_us_564cdd76e4b00b7997f8cac9 [https://
perma.cc/7DWP-BY2Y] (“Civic-minded consumers will have new incentive to fre-
quent Starbucks, Hallmark and Nordstrom this holiday, as all three received top
rankings on the Human Rights Campaign’s annual Corporate Equality In-
dex . . . .”); Susan Adams, The Best Big American Companies for LGBT Employees,
FORBES (Dec. 9, 2011, 3:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/
2011/12/09/the-best-big-american-companies-for-lgbt-employees/ [https://
perma.cc/97ZP-2SR3] (“Chevron, Bank of America and AT&T all got top marks as
the best workplaces for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) employees,
according to a survey released yesterday by the Human Rights Campaign . . . .”).
384 See, e.g., Amanda Chatel, 7 Companies That Don’t Support Gay Rights,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2013, 5:08 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/10/16/anti-gay-companies_n_4110344.html [https://perma.cc/4YT2-
82ML] (“The United States Department of Labor may have ruled that all busi-
nesses in every state must provide benefit coverage for same-sex marriages, but
that doesn’t mean it’s going to put an end to homophobia.  Here are 8 companies
that prove this to be true.”).
385 CEI 2017, supra note 379, at 2. R
386 Cf. Lisa Fackler, In Gay Rights, Private Sector is ‘Unlikely Hero,’ Survey
Finds, LA TIMES (Aug. 14, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/aug/14/na
tion/na-gays14 [https://perma.cc/AW82-RBU9] (“Private industry is leading the
way in ending discrimination against [LGBTQ+] employees . . . .”).
387 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
388 Cf. Amber Phillips, How LGBT Activists Win in States Like Georgia: Empha-
size Economics, Not Just Equality, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/03/28/how-lgbt-activists-beat-
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Moreover, some commentators have proposed using a cer-
tification mark to indicate that a company or employer has
committed to the “exact substantive duties of ENDA.”389  The
certification mark, which takes the form of a symbol with an
“FE”390 inside a circle, announces to customers and employees
that the company or employer is committed to employment
non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gen-
der identity.391  Employers and corporations gain the right to
use the mark only if they sign a licensing agreement agreeing to
follow the provisions of ENDA.392  The commentators note that
the certification mark is merely an “incremental strategy in the
struggle for equality.”393
The commentators also contend that the strategy will have
other beneficial effects.394  Privatizing ENDA using the certifi-
cation mark has three additional benefits: (1) amelioration, (2)
demonstration, and (3) realignment.395  First, in states that do
not have robust workplace protections for LGBTQ+ individuals,
privatizing ENDA provides an ameliorative private right of ac-
tion and legal remedy to unprotected workers who are discrimi-
nated against based on their sexual orientation or gender
identity.396  Second, companies and employers adopting the
mark will demonstrate to lawmakers the prudence of adopting
ENDA or the state equivalent as well as inform them about the
operational and litigation-related implications of the law.397
Third, the adoption of the mark by a significant number of
companies and employers may produce new opportunities ei-
back-unfriendly-laws-emphasize-economics-not-just-equality/?utm_term=.421
515b50acb [https://perma.cc/D2DV-7AAD] (“There’s a clear economic argument
for businesses to jump into [the] contentious social issue [of LGBTQ+ rights]. . . .
Corporations are acutely aware of their image among the coveted 18-34-year-old
category.”).
389 Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Priva-
tizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1641 (2006).
Certification marks can be quite influential in the marketplace. See, e.g., Roger D.
Wynne, The Emperor’s New Eco-Logos?: A Critical Review of the Scientific Certifica-
tion Systems Environmental Report Card and the Green Seal Certification Mark
Programs, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 57 (1994) (“[The Green Seal’s] Certification Mark
could be an effective tool for influencing the purchase decisions of green and
latent green consumers, and thus for stimulating some changes from manufac-
turers eager to expand or protect market share.”).
390 “FE” stands for “Fair Employment.”
391 Ayres & Brown, supra note 389, at 1641. R
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 See id. at 1641–42.
395 Id. at 1647.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 1648.
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ther to compromise in Congress or state legislatures or to serve
as a “wedge issue” to pressure politicians to support ENDA.398
The proposal to privatize ENDA, however, can just as easily be
applied to the Equality Act in the context of employment dis-
crimination and workplace protections.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, South African non-discrimination and equal
protection law and jurisprudence should serve as a model for
the United States.  The South African Constitution, South Afri-
can Constitutional Court cases, and laws passed by the South
African Parliament all mandate that LGBTQ+ South Africans
be treated equally to their heterosexual counterparts.  Discrim-
ination against LGBTQ+ South Africans is expressly forbid-
den—including in the employment context.  The United States
still lacks comprehensive federal employment non-discrimina-
tion laws or workplace protections for LGBTQ+ individuals.
Extending Title VII—either via court decision or by passing the
Equality Act—will provide robust workplace protections on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  This approach
is the most effective way to close the gap between South African
non-discrimination and equal protection law and jurispru-
dence and that of the United States.  In the meantime, South
Africa will be the proverbial “city upon a hill,”399 and the United
States will continue to abdicate its moral responsibility.
398 Id. at 1650.
399 John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, WINTHROP SOC’Y, https://
www.winthropsociety.com/doc_charity.php [https://perma.cc/TVB9-RFAF]
(presenting a thesis written on board the ship Arbella in 1630); see also John F.
Kennedy, President-Elect, United States of America, Address at the General Court
of Massachusetts (Jan. 9, 1961) (“I have been guided by the standard John Win-
throp set before his shipmates on the flagship Arbella three hundred and thirty-
one years ago. . . .  ‘We must always consider,’ he said, ‘that we shall be a city upon
a hill—the eyes of all people are upon us.’” (emphasis added)); Ronald Reagan,
President, United States of America, “A Vision for America” Election Eve Address
(Nov. 3, 1980) (“I have quoted John Winthrop’s words more than once upon the
campaign trail this year—for I believe that Americans in 1980 are every bit as
committed to that vision of a shining ‘city on a hill,’ as were those long ago
settlers . . . .”  (emphasis added)); Barack Obama, U.S. Senator, Commencement
Address at the University of Massachusetts, Boston (June 2, 2006) (“As the earli-
est settlers arrived on the shores of Boston and Salem and Plymouth, they
dreamed of building a City upon a Hill. . . .  I see students that have come here
from over 100 different countries, believing like those first settlers that they too
could find a home in this City on a Hill—that they too could find success in the
unlikeliest of places.” (emphasis added)); Mitt Romney, Address at the Hinckley
Institute of Politics at the University of Utah (Mar. 3, 2016) (“[Donald Trump’s]
domestic policies would lead to recession.  His foreign policies would make
America and the world less safe.  He has neither the temperament nor the judge-
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ment to be president.  And his personal qualities would mean that America would
cease to be a shining city on a hill.” (emphasis added)).
